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"We the People": John Locke, 
Collective Constitutional Rights, and 
Standing to Challenge 
Government Action 
Donald L. Doernberg? 
The first three words of the preamble to the Constitution1 suggest 
one element unique to the American Revolution: its outcome was a gov- 
ernment created by the people, not one existing independently of them 
or, in some respect, over them.2 Indeed, the preamble reads like a charge 
to the new government, as though the Framers had said "this is what 
you, the government, shall do," and then in the Constitution said "and 
here is how you shall accomplish it." The idea of popular sovereignty in 
the United States antedates the Constitution, appearing in its best known 
form in the Declaration of Independence's admonition that governments 
must be viewed as "deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
g~verned,"~ and ultimately being attributed to the influence of both John 
Locke4 and Jean Jacques Rousseau.' 
One problem that the American legal system has encountered is the 
enforcement of the limits set by the Constitution and statutes on govern- 
ment operatione6 Whether the government has exceeded its lawful 
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1984-85; 
Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Yale University; J.D. 1969, Columbia University. 
I gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful editing suggestions of Professors Burton Leiser and 
Donald H. Zeigler, and the research assistance of Steven Chananie, Jonathan Diamond, Veronica 
Hakim, Teri Shulman, Sarah Whalen, and the staff of the Pace University Law Library. 
1. U.S. CONST. preamble: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
2. Alexander Hamilton, arguing that the proposed adoption of a bill of rights was unneces- 
sary and potentially harmful, relied heavily on the nature of the new American government. "Here, 
in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of 
particular reservations." THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). He 
also characterized the Constitution as "professedly founded upon the power of the people, and exe- 
cuted by their immediate representatives and servants." Id. 
3. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
4. See infra note 41. 
5. J. R O U ~ ~ E A U ,  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (D. Cress ed. 1983). 
6. It  is universally recognized that the United States government was intended to be one of 
carefully circumscribed powers, defined by enumeration. This limitation is, perhaps, most directly 
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bounds is a question for the judiciary to decide, as Marbury v. Madison7 
made clear. But who may ask the courts to decide? That question is 
ordinarily resolved by application of the doctrine of standing.* In recent 
years, questions of standing have been determined by application of a 
two-part test. First, the court must examine whether the party seeking 
relief has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is- 
sues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional  question^."^ Second, there must be "some connection be- 
tween the official action challenged and some legally protected interest of 
the party challenging that action."1° The first part of the test, commonly 
referred to as injury-in-fact," is indispensable because it is viewed as part 
of the case-or-controversy requ i remen t ;12  hence, it is juri~dictional.'~ 
reflected in the 10th amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu- 
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. 
CONST. amend. X. 
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803). 
8. The question of standing concerns whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise 
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N ~ O N A L  LAW $8 3-17 to -29 
(1978). 
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962). This first requirement, then, focuses on the party 
seeking relief rather than on the nature of the relief sought. 
10. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969). The phrase "legally protected interest" 
has been rejected by the Court as conveying too restrictive a view of this part of the test. See infra 
notes 217-26 and accompanying text. But current law still requires some nexus between the chal- 
lenged official activity and a legally cognizable interest of the plaintiff. As Professor Tribe has 
explained: 
The nexus requirement bears a family resemblance to the "scope of the risk" doctrine in 
the law of torts. Thus, in tort law, it is not enough that the defendant's violation of the law 
caused injury to the plaintiff: the defendant also must owe the plaintiff some duty. Simi- 
larly, in the federal law of standing, it is not enough that the plaintiffbe injured by some act 
or omission of the defendant; the defendant must additionally have violated some duty 
owed to the plaintiff. Applying this doctrine to challenges of official government action or 
inaction, the relevant question would not be simply whether the official or agency violated 
the law, but rather whether the official or agency violated any duty to the plaintiff. 
L. TRIBE, supra note 8, 8 3-22, at 98 (footnotes omitted). 
11. See, eg., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 8, 8 3-20. 
12. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2, cl. 1. 
13. The Court explained the jurisdictional nature of the injury-in-fact test in 1982: 
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. I11 requires the party who invokes the court's authority 
to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone. Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91,99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and 
"is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky WeYelfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does Art. I11 limit the federal 
judicial power "to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a 
system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution 
through the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. [83, 97 (196811. 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (footnotes omitted). In the same opinion, the Court recognized: 
Heinonline - -  73 Cal. L. Rev. 53 1985 
54 CALIFORNIA LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 7352 
The second part of the test is commonly called the nexus requirement14 
and is not constitutionally mandated.15 The nexus test, first announced 
in FIast v. Cohen,16 requires examination of the substantive issues raised 
in a case "to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the sta- 
tus asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated."" 
Unfortunately, this two-part test proved extremely difficult to apply, 
leading the Court to observe in 1969 that "[tlhe concept of standing to 
sue. . . 'is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere 
in [the concept ofl justiciability' in general.'"' The nexus requirement in 
particular has come under fire. 
The search for nexus . . . risks begging the vital question of whether the 
plaintiff is truly claiming injury to his own legally protected interest or 
whether the plaintiff, although claiming a material injury, is in fact as- 
serting the interests of someone else but should nonetheless be accorded 
surrogate standing. Even when the nexus rule does not operate to deny 
standing, therefore, it may entail substantial disadvantages. 
Even more pointedly, the rule of nexus can induce denials of stand- 
ing where a decision on the merits would be preferable.'g 
As a consequence, Professor Tribe has advocated dropping the nexus re- 
quirement in many circumstances, particularly where official action is 
[I]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of 
the "standing" requirement have been required by Art. 111 ex proprio vigore, or whether 
they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by 
the language of the Constitution. 
Id. at  471. 
14. See, eg., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,78-81 (1978); 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1968). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 8, 4 3-22. 
15. See, eg., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,78-81 (1978). 
"Unlike the 'injury in fact' requirement, the 'nexus' requirement is clearly not compelled by article 
111 but represents only a prudential limitation upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction." L. TRIBE, 
supra note 8, 8 3-22, at 97 n.2 (emphasis in original). 
16. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). FIast was a taxpayer's challenge to government action that allegedly 
violated the first amendment's establishment clause. 
17. Id. at  102. The nexus requirement thus stated has two components. First, the taxpayer 
must show a connection between his status as a taxpayer and the challenged activity. Id. Taxpayer 
standing therefore requires a challenge to some exercise of the government's taxing power. second, 
the taxpayer must show that the exercise of the taxing power violates a specific constitutional restric- 
tion on that power, rather than that the challenged activity merely exceeds a more general restriction 
on govemmental power. Id. at 102-03. 
It  was unclear in FIast whether the nexus requirement applied to suits not brought by taxpayers 
qua taxpayers. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,618 (1973), the Court applied the test in a 
nontaxpayer suit. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. Five years later,-however, in Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978), the Court explicitly 
repudiated the test's applicability except in taxpayer suits. See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying 
text. 
18. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,423 (1969) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 
(1968)). 
19. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, 4 3-27, at 110. 
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challenged as being lawless.20 Professor Tribe's suggestion parallels that 
of Professor Davis, who observed: 
The natural system is that of the common law: If A and B are private 
parties and A hurts B, B has standing to get a determination of the legal- 
ity of A's action. Why should not the law be the same, whether A is the 
government, and [sic] agency, an officer, or a private party, and whether 
the injury is to B's person, his physical property, or his intangible inter- 
ests? Is not the natural system the simple one that injury in fact is 
enough for standing?" 
Thus, Professor Davis, too, would leave only the injury-in-fact require- 
ment for standing, noting that "[tlhe only problems about staiding 
should be what interests deserve protection against injury, and what 
should be enough to constitute an injury."22 
This Article supports Professor Tribe's and Professor Davis' sugges- 
tion, but on a different basis. In addition to the problems outlined above, 
the Article suggests that the nexus requirement also overlooks one of the 
fundamental characteristics of American government foreshadowed in 
20. Professor Tribe believes that challenges to governmental action do, and should, stand on 
special footing: 
When official action is challenged on grounds of illegality, values beyond those tangibly 
protected by the violated law or constitutional provision come powerfully into play. Both 
the value of legality as such, and the public respect which rests on it, may be seriously 
impaired whenever courts equipped to remedy an illegality at the behest of a factually 
injured party allow clearly illegal procedures or results to stand on the sole ground that all 
of the material interests required to be considered or "accommodated" by the statutory (or 
even constitutional) scheme were satisfied with the official action. To say in such circum- 
stances that the "abstract concern for vindicating the bare words of statutes seems too 
attenuated a justification for disturbing mutually satisfactory arrangements struck by all of 
the relevant public and private interests," is to deprecate the "relevant public interest" in 
the rule of law. In any event, letting "mutually satisfactory arrangements" stand on such a 
ground requires assuming or  finding that those who are silent are indeed "satisfied" rather 
than merely ignorant, impecunious, inadequately organized, or  simply exhausted. At a 
minimum, the requirement for nexus should be dropped and surrogate standing allowed 
whenever a court has reasonable ground to believe that one of these alternative explana- 
tions has played a major role in the absence of any challenge by someone with direct 
standing. 
Id. § 3-27, at  111-12 (footnotes omitted). Thus, Professor Tribe argues that "if government's over- 
riding duty to act lawfully is accorded serious weight," the nexus requirement ought to be aban- 
doned as a matter of sound policy. Id. 5 3-28, at  113. Justice Powell has also suggested 
abandoning the nexus test. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring). His views and Richardson are discussed infra in Part 11. 
21. Davis, The Liberalized L o w  of Standing, 37 U. CHI.  L. REV. 450, 468 (1970). In this 
respect, Professor Davis echoes Justice Frankfurter: "A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge 
governmental action of a sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action 
cognizable by the courts." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed, Justice Brennan concurs in this suggestion. See infra text 
accompanying notes 221-25. 
This Article suggests, however, that this injury-in-fact concept is underinclusive. Private par- 
ties, in their dealings with each other, are not bound by a charter by which one party creates the 
other and gives him or her legitimacy. Because of the nature of American government, the Davis 
tort metaphor fails at  that point. See infra Part I .  
22. Davis, supra note 21, at 468. 
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the writings of John L ~ c k e ~ ~  and woven into the Constitution by the 
Framers: the concept that rights, in addition to being individually held, 
may also be held collectively by the body politic, which creates and pro- 
vides the justification for civil g~vernrnent .~~ In Professor Davis' terms, 
there are additional interests, as yet unrecognized in the law of standing, 
that deserve protection against injury. The existence of collective inter- 
ests has been widely recognized by courts and scholars,2' but not in the 
context discussed here. Collective interests are most often discussed 
when they are perceived to be in conflict with rights or privileges asserted 
by an ind i~ idua l .~~  They are not evaluated in terms of their impact on 
the doctrine of standing. This Article suggests that there is a class of 
cases where individual and collective interests, far from being opposed, 
actually coincide--cases where the government is charged with violating 
the Constitution. Moreover, in a significant subclass of those cases, cur- 
rent standing doctrine makes impossible both judicial protection of such 
collective interests and judicial insistence that government operate only 
within the bounds of the Constitution. The effect is that certain constitu- 
tional provisions effectively exist only at the whim and during the good 
will of the government, because the collective interest in enforcement of 
such provisions will not be protected by the courts. This Article urges, 
therefore, that the existence and recognition of collective rights require a 
modification of standing doctrine so that such rights can be protected 
through judicial review.27 
23. See generally J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT Second Treatise (P. Laslett ed. 
1960). 
24. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
25. See generally infra Part 111, Section B; see also Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests as a 
Method of Constitutional Adjudication, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1977). 
26. See, cg., Moms v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983) (public interest in protection of 
victim's rights balanced against individual's sixth amendment right to counsel); Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (public interest in open trials balanced against individual's 6th 
and 14th amendment rights to fair trial); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (state's interest 
in the health of a prospective mother and in the potentiality of human life balanced against individ- 
ual's constitutionally based privacy interests in making the abortion decision); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972) (state's interest in universal compulsory education balanced against 
individual's first amendment right to free exercise of religion); Carnara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 533 (1967) (public interest in enforcement of health and fire codes balanced against individual's 
fourth amendment right to privacy); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-52 (1961) (public 
interest in careful regulation of the fitness of attorneys balanced against individual's 1st and 14th 
amendment rights to free association). 
27. Professor Berger has suggested that a broad concept of standing is consistent with our 
common law history in cases where illegal government action is challenged. His theory, however, is 
based on the ready availability of the prerogative writs to English citizens without requiring personal 
injury-in-fact and does not explicitly deal with more direct influences on the American process of 
creating a national government. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional 
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969). Other scholars have also proposed broadening the doctrine 
of standing, effectively eliminating it in public actions, on the ground that it would be better policy to 
do so. See, e.g., Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions (pt. l), 74 HARV. L. REV. 
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The Article is presented in three Parts. Part I documents the enor- 
mous effect that Locke's political philosophy had on the Constitution's 
Framers and traces the idea of collective rights through Locke's Second 
T r e a t i ~ e , ~ ~  showing how Locke viewed government as a trustee and soci- 
ety as the settlor-beneficiary that forms and gives legitimacy to the gov- 
ernment. Part I1 reviews the development of the current doctrine of 
standing and demonstrates how the current standing model creates a 
class of cases where government may, with impunity, violate the Consti- 
tution. Part I11 demonstrates the anomaly of the Supreme Court's cur- 
rent doctrine in a society founded on the ideas of John Locke. It then 
explores the constitutional provisions where collective rights have al- 
ready been recognized by the courts,29 though not with respect to stand- 
ing analysis. Finally, Part I11 proposes a revision of the current test for 
standing to ensure that vindication of society's collective rights is possi- 
ble without creating universal standing and thus threatening the courts 
with a tidal wave of litigation brought by "officious  intermeddler^."^^ 
1 
JOHN LOCKE AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
It would be difficult to overstate John Locke's influence on the 
American Revolution and the people who created the government that 
followed it.31 One writer notes that most eighteenth-century liberal 
doctrines can be traced to Locke and his concept that community power 
1265 (1961); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984). But see Sedler, Assertion of 
Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L REV. 1308 (1982) (personal injury- 
in-fact should be required for standing, and third parties should not be able to assert others' injuries 
in order to get standing). By contrast, this Article proposes that it is not necessary to discard stand- 
ing doctrine entirely in public actions; it merely is appropriate to recognize the full range of inter- 
ests-individual and collectivedeserving protection under the Constitution. 
28. J. LOCKE, supra note 23. 
29. I have previously identified one such right that arises from the fourth amendment, 
Doernberg, "The Right of the People'? Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1983), but I focused on support of the collective fourth 
amendment right, implicit in the exclusionary rule, which is recognized by the Supreme Court itself. 
This Article demonstrates that the concept of collective rights has antecedents in the philosophical 
underpinnings of the American state. 
30. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, 9 3-22, at  99. 
31. Locke can be regarded as the advance ideologist of the American Revolution. 
He developed a set of political ideas which has very largely served as the basis for Ameri- 
can political values and for the institutional structure which American and British govern- 
ment has since assumed. His importance for American political thought can hardly be 
overestimated; indeed, there is probably no better short summary of the ideas of Locke 
than the American Declaration of Independence. 
D. MINAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 47 (1964) (footnote omitted); see 
also L. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY: EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1689-1763, 
at 37-40 (1968). 
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resides in the majority.32 To be sure, the colonists were influenced by 
other political philosophers as well, notably Blackstone, Hume, 
Montesquieu, Paine, Rousseau, Sidney, and Adam Smith,33 "[blut Locke 
came nearest to the heart of the case. If an occasional criticism was 
passed on his [specific proposals], as was done by John Adams, . . . it 
was only to show how 'the most resplendent genius' may fail in 
practice."34 
This is not to say, however, that the Framers accepted his theories 
completely and without question. In some ways, American political phi- 
losophy went beyond Locke's, as for example by its provisions for re- 
moval of officials and alteration of the form of government without 
political revol~tion.'~ But as a general matter, "the framers established 
their government in frank Lockean style upon the consent of the gov- 
e ~ m e d . " ~ ~  The Framers truly rejected only Locke's concept of absolute 
legislative supremacy over the executive and the courts, creating the 
"three coequal branches,"37 which furnish the primary distinction be- 
tween the American and English systems of go~ernment .~~  This distinc- 
tion is important to the theory of standing presented in this Article. 
Before turning to the Supreme Court's development of the modem doc- 
trine of standing, however, it is necessary to understand more of the phi- 
32. Salvemini, The Concepts ofDemocracy and Liberty in the Eighteenth Century, in THE CON- 
STITUTION RECONSIDERED 105 (C. Read ed. 1938). 
33. MacIver, European Doctrines and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSID- 
ERED, supra note 32, at 51, 52; see also Salvemini, supra note 32, at 105. 
34. MacIver, supra note 33, at 52 (quoting 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 463-64 (C. Adams ed. 
1865)). The extent of the early American response to that genius is reckoned by MacIver to be 
nearly universal. "Add to Locke's teaching Montesquieu's more explicit doctrine of division of pow- 
ers, inject into it some republican fervor, and you have the whole substance of the Virginia Bill of 
Rights, and indeed all the preambles, manifestoes, and declarations of principle that followed." Id. 
at  53; see also E. DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS 
TODAY 20 (1950); A. RANNEY, THE GOVERNING OF MEN 152, 161-62 (1966). 
Locke's influence on the American idea of separation of powers may have been as great as 
Montesquieu's. Daniel Minar notes that it was Locke's version of the doctrine that "later was to 
become so integral a part of the American political ideology and procedure." D. MINAR, supra note 
31, at 52. 
35. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at 77; see also infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text. 
36. Gabriel, Constitutional Democracy: A Nineteenth-Century Faith, in THE CONSTITUTION 
RECONSIDERED, supra note 32, at 247. Professor Mace notes, "Locke has long been considered the 
political theorist who exerted the greatest influence upon our natural-rights heritage. . . . Many go 
so far as to suggest his influence upon the American Founding Fathers was so great that the United 
States may be termed a Lockean nation." G. MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES, AND THE FEDERALIST PA- 
P E R ~  9 (1979) (footnote omitted). Professor Mace disagrees with this, however, concluding that 
Hobbes' influence was more important. Id. at  xii. The majority view, nevertheless, seems clearly to 
be on the side of Locke. 
37. See, cg.,  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,707 (1974); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 
3 1 1 n.6 (1973). 
38. MacIver, supra note 33, at 53. 
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losophy that so influenced the Framers and then to examine the specific 
reflections of Locke's ideas in American political thought. 
A. John Locke's Philosophy 
John Locke is perhaps most commonly associated with the doctrine 
of government by consent of the governed. Throughout the Second 
Trea t i~e ,~~  Locke emphasized that civil government arises only when 
people remove themselves from the state of nature by combining to form 
Men being . . . all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out o f  
this ~ s t a 6 ,  and subjectedto the Political Power of another, without his 
own Consent. The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Nat- 
ural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with 
other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, 
. - 
safe, and peaceable living one amongst another. . . . When any number 
of Men have so consented to make one Community or Government, they 
are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick, wherein 
the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.41 
39. J. LOCKE, supra note 23. 
40. "To those that say, There were never any Men in the State of Nature; I will not oppose the 
Authority. . . . But I moreover affirm, That all Men are naturally in that State, and remain so, till 
by their own Consents they make themselves Members of some Politick Society . . . ." Id. $ 15, at 
295-96; see also id. $99, at 351, $ 102, at 352-53, $8 104-106, at  354-56, $ 171, at  399-400. 
41. Id. $ 95, at 348-49 (emphasis in original). Moreover, because few people entering an estab- 
lished civil society affirmatively consent to its government, and to avoid the illegitimacy that would 
result from such a mass absence of consent, Locke constructed a theory of tacit consent, struggling 
to ensure that the theory was neither oppressive nor illusory: 
[Elvery Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any 
Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to 
the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this 
his Possession be of Land, to him and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or 
whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the 
very being of any one within the Territories of that Government. 
Id. 8 119, at  365-66 (emphasis in original). Thus, Locke premised the entire existence of government 
on his theory of consent. Indeed, it has been noted that "[tlhere is no point which Locke insisted 
upon more constantly and more forcefully than that all legitimate governments rest upon the con- 
sent of the governed." S. LAMPRECHT, HE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE 
136 (1918). But Locke expanded the consent idea by hypothesizing a form of tacit consent embrac- 
ing virtually all persons not actively engaged in forming the new state. 
Students of civil procedure will recognize the genesis of two famous cases in the preceding 
quotation. Locke clearly foreshadows the declaration in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), 
that, for in personam jurisdiction over the defendant to exist, "it is essential in each case that there 
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. And, 
though perhaps less emphatically, Locke's reliance on free travel upon the highway as a basis for 
inferring consensual submission to governmental power anticipated Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 
(1927): 
[I]n advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a non-resident, the State 
may require him to appoint one of its officials as his agent on whom process may be served 
in proceedings growing out of such use. . . . p h i s  Court has recognized the] power of the 
State to exclude a non-resident until the formal appointment is made. And, having the 
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One reason this part of Locke's theory is so well known is its ap- 
pearance in the Declaration of Independen~e.~~ Moreover, the concept is 
routinely referred to in cases where governmental action is challenged on 
constitutional grounds.43 But one cannot properly understand Locke's 
political theory solely in terms of his idea of government by consent. 
Indeed, even the consent theory itself cannot be understood in isolation 
from the rest of the Second Treatise. Consent is, of course, the hallmark 
of a properly governed society. "The unmistakeable sign of civil society 
having come into being is when every individual has resigned up to the 
society or the public his individual power to exercise the law of nature 
and protect his property."44 But several questions remain: How should 
the consented-to government exercise its power?45 More important, 
what relationship should the government have to those who have con- 
sented to its existence, whether explicitly or tacitly?46 
Government in a Lockean society is the product of a compact 
among people.47 Government is, in fact, the creation of such a compact, 
power so to exclude, the State may declare that the use of the highway by the non-resident 
is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be 
served. 
Id. at  356-57 (citations omitted). 
42. See supra text accompanying note 3. The doctrine is also well known because it is ancient. 
See, eg., PLATO, Crito, in THE FOUR SOCRATIC DIALOGUES OF PLATO 112 (B. Jowett trans. 1903). 
43. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,233 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 
(1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
44. Laslett, Introduction to J. LOCKE, supra note 23, at 106. 
45. The manner in which a Lockean government is to exercise its power is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Locke considered this topic extensively in chapters IX through XI11 of the Second 
Treatise. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, $9 123-168, at 368-98. 
46. Much has been written about Locke's concepts of individual rights and his limitations on 
the power of government in recognition of those rights. See, e.g., R. LEMOS, HOBBES AND LOCKE: 
POWER AND CONSENT 103-08 (1978); Laslett, supra note 44, at 99-106. Professor Kendall has 
suggested, however, that Locke is properly viewed as an extreme majority-rule democrat, whose 
attention to individual rights is, at best, incidental to his main thrust. W. KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY-RULE (1959). Professor Kendall is not alone in this view. Pro- 
fessor Macpherson suggests that Locke's view of individualism necessarily implies a collective view 
of society because Locke's political civil society is supreme over the individual. 
The wholesale transfer of individual rights was necessary to get sufficient collective force 
for the protection of property. Locke could afford to propose this transfer because the civil 
society was to be in the control of men of property. Under these circumstances individual- 
ism must, and could safely, be left to the collective supremacy of the state. 
Macpherson, The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory, in LOCKE AND BERKELEY: A COLLEC- 
TION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 227 (C. Martin & D. Armstrong eds. 1968). 
Whether or not the Kendall view of Locke is entirely accurate, it begins to bring into focus the 
relationship of the people to government as developed in the Second Treatise. Each person in the 
state of nature is entitled to enforce natural law individually. See J. LOCKE, supra note 23, $$ 6-8, at 
288-90, $ 13, at  293-94. But in society the enforcement rights and power are collective. 
47. See J. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d ed. 1957). The idea of government as the 
product of a compact or  contract is echoed in early American history. Jefferson accepted the con- 
tract theory as representative of an agreement among the states, id. at 236-37, and the contract idea 
in fact appeared in many state constitutions through the mid-1800's, id. at 231. Justice Story saw the 
Heinonline - -  73 Cal. L. Rev. 60 1985 
19851 COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND STANDING 6 1 
yet it is not a party to the compact. As Professor Laslett points out: 
If a contract is to be set up, or understood, it is necessary that the parties 
to it should each get something out of it, and applied to politics this 
would mean that the government got something out of governing which 
the subjects are bound to give. Now this is what Locke was most anxious 
to avoid. Although contractually related to each other, the people are 
not contractually obliged to government, and governors benefit from gov- 
erning only as fellow members of the "Politick Body." They are merely 
deputies for the people, trustees who can be discarded if they fail in their 
trust.48 
Thus, government may not properly insist upon any rights accruing to it 
from the people's compact. It is merely a functionary, "defined and lim- 
ited by the end for which political society is e~tablished."~~ 
Hence, the nature of the formative process of civil government gives 
rise to the concept of government-as-trustee-a political trust for the 
public good in which the people are at  once settlors and beneficiarie~.~~ 
Proper understanding of the trusteeship and the manner in which it dif- 
fers from the social compact that creates civil government is essential to 
understanding Locke and his importance to modern American concepts 
of rights against the government and standing to enforce them. Locke 
distinguished the process of compact, which creates a community, from 
the further process by which the community entrusts political power to a 
government. In other words, Locke saw both a "contract of society" and 
a "contract of government," though for Locke, this second "contractyy is 
- 
not a contract at all-it is a trust." 
arrangement as  an implicit contract between the community as a collective whole and each individ- 
ual member, wherein the community agreed to protect its citizens on the condition that they obey its 
laws. Id. at 237. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793), Chief Justice Jay de- 
scribes the Constitution as "a compact made by the people of the United States." See also Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (" 'A body politic.' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitu- 
tion of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, 
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common 
good.' "); J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 5 97, at  350, 3 99, at 351. 
48. Laslett, supra note 44, a t  113 (citations omitted). 
Although whoever holds legislative power is constitutionally supreme within the limits of 
the Constitution, they are nevertheless still only the fiduciary agents of the community. As 
such, they are subject to the supreme power of the community and subject to removal by 
the community if in its judgment they have violated their trust. 
R. LEMOS, supra note 46, at 122. 
49. Laslett, supra note 44, at 11 1. 
50. The concept obovernment as trustee is not unique to Locke. " m h e  idea of trust was also 
very common in the seventeenth century, and while it is possible that eighteenth-century writers 
took it from Locke rather than from other authors, it is clear that it was already a political common- 
place before Locke's time." J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 156 (2d ed. 1973). 
In fact, Gough traces the trust idea, a t  least with respect to the executive, back to the thirteenth 
century and the reign of Richard 11. Id. at 165; see also Laslett, supra note 44, at 112. For a general 
discussion of the development of trust theory in English political thought, see J. GOUGH, supra, at 
154-92. 
51. See Laslett, supra note 44, at 112-13. 
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Several writers suggest that Locke's repeated resort to the trust met- 
a p h o P  should not be taken to connote a trust in a literal or formal 
sense.53 Yet it is clear in the Second Treatise that he uses the term as 
more than a synonym for "confidence," and that this heightened use of 
the trust concept is fully reflective of the political thought of his time.54 
For example, John Milton, having a view of the origins of civil society 
similar to Locke's, argued that "the power of Kings and Magistrates is 
nothing else, but what is [only] derivative, transferred and committed to 
them in trust from the people, to the Common good of them 
Locke's detailed discussion of trust demonstrates the existence of 
the trust and the collective nature of its creation. The legislature's 
supreme power 
is not, nor can possibly be absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and For- 
tunes of the People. For it being but the joynt power of every Member of 
the Society given up to that Person, or Assembly, which is Legislator, it 
can be no more than those persons had in a State of Nature before they 
enter'd into Society, and gave up to the ~ o m m u n i t y . ~ ~  
Locke saw a two-step progression from the state of nature to civil society: 
first the combination of individuals into society, and second the vesting 
of power in the legislature as a trust.57 Because the legislature's power is 
only derived from "a positive voluntary Grant and Institution" by the 
people, it cannot be transferred by the legislature to any other hands.58 
Thus, Locke's legislature functions within the trust metaphor. 
In emphasizing that the transfer of power from community to legis- 
lature is a delegation rather than an alienation, Locke explicitly makes 
the legislature's power subordinate to the people's "Supream Power to 
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act con- 
trary to the trust reposed in them."5g Consequently, the legislature is 
52. J. L o c ~ ~ , s u p r a  note23, $9 22, 110-111, 134, 136, 139, 142, 149, 155-156, 164, 171, 210, 
221-222, 226-227, 231, 239-240, 242. 
53. See, e.g., J. GOUGH, supra note 47, at 175-78; Laslett, supra note 44, at 112. 
54. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. 
55. Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magktrafes, in 40 YALE STUDIES I N  ENGLISH 12 (A. 
Cook & W. Allison eds. 191 1). Such thought was true in practice as well as in theory. During the 
trial of Charles I, the prosecutor explicitly presented his case to the court as a breach of trust matter, 
arguing that by reason of Charles' breach, he was required to answer to his superiors, the people who 
had established the trust. J. GOUGH, supra note 50, at 169 (citing J. MUDDIMAN, T H E  T R I A L  OF 
CHARLES I (1928)). Gough also notes that the trust theory appeared, in some respects anticipating 
Locke's theory, in the work of Philip Hunton in 1643, id. at 171, and in R. FERGUSON, A BRIEF 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRINCE OF ORANGE'S DESCENT INTO ENGLAND (1689), where the execu- 
tive powers of the king are described as having been delegated in trust. J. GOUGH, supra note 50, nt 
175. Further, "the accession of James I was soon followed by far-reaching constitutional disputes 
between king and parliament, in which the trust concept came to be freely used." Id. at 176. 
56. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, $ 135, at 375-76 (emphasis in original). 
57. Id. 9 136, at 376-77. 
58. Id. $ 141, at 380-81. 
59. Id. $ 149, at 384-85 (emphasis in original). 
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responsible to the body politic in a far more direct way than to any indi- 
vidual member of The legislative power is explicitly "limited to the 
publick good of the S ~ c i e t y , " ~ ~  and it is to the society that the legislature 
is resp~nsible .~~ 
The theory of trust so explicitly applied to the legislative power also 
affects the executive. For example, the limited power to call the legisla- 
ture into session is one of trust, to be exercised for the benefit of the 
people.63 Moreover, even though the executive may be given certain pre- 
rogatives by the legislature to deal with unforeseen circumstances, the 
prerogatives themselves must be "imp~oyed for the benefit of the Com- 
munity, and suitably to the trust and ends of the G~vernment . "~~ 
In all circumstances, therefore, Locke not only views the institution 
of government as a trust, but also as one created by the collective body of 
the people and responsible to it. "Locke suggests that the society as trus- 
tor assigns to the government as trustee a fund of power to be exercised 
on behalf of the safety (or pleasure) of the individuals of the commu- 
 nit^."^' The obligation created by the trust is one way; the government- 
as-trustee is obligated to the people, not they to it. 
The collective aspect of Lockean society extends even to the point 
where government ceases to function properly. Perhaps the most impor- 
tant demonstration of the community's collective voice is found in 
Locke's concept of the right of revolution. The Second Treatise discusses 
dissolution of government at length,66 and explicitly considers the prob- 
lem of a populace oppressed by its government. 
But if any one should ask, Must the People then always lay themselves 
open to the Cruelty and Rage of Tyranny? . . . I Answer: Self-defence 
is a part of the Law of Nature; nor can it be denied the Community, even 
against the King himself. . . . This therefore is the Priviledge of the 
People in general, above what any private Person hath; That particular 
Men are allowed . . . to have no other Remedy but Patience; but the 
Body of the People may with Respect resist intolerable Tyranny. . . .67 
The collective right of revolution may be exercised whenever "tyranny" 
60. In this respect, of course, the structure of Locke's political system supports the views of 
Kendall and Macpherson that Locke is a collective, majoritarian democrat. See supra note 46. 
Locke's view of the legislature's responsibility to the collective body politic finds its ultimate 
expression in his right of revolution, discussed infra at notes 66-100 and accompanying text. 
61. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 8 135, at 375-76 (emphasis in original); see also id. 3 171, at 399- 
400, 9 216, at 427, 9 229, at 435. 
62. Locke's view of the continuing responsibility of the legislature to the people contrasts 
sharply with Hobbes' insistence on the absolute rights of the sovereign once created by the social 
compact. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 113-20 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1960). 
63. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 9 156, at 389-90. 
64. Id. 9 161, at 393. 
65. D. MINAR, supra note 31, at 49. 
66. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, $9 21 1-243. 
67. Id. 5 233, at 438-39, (quoting (in translation) w. BARCLAY, DE REGNO ET REGALI POTE- 
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occurs, that is when government acts beyond purposes specified by the 
people.68 Thus, the collective rights that underlie the f~rmation of civil 
government also give rise to the collective right to dissolve the govern- 
ment when the people's trust is breached.69 
This treatment of the right of revolution illustrates the pervasive ef- 
fect that the method used to form a civil society has upon the society's 
relationship with the government it creates. It also exemplifies a corol- 
lary to the theory of trust: government is accountable to the people as a 
whole. The right of revolution Locke describes is no more than a method 
- 
by which the accounting may be made; the accountability must be to the 
group, not to any individual member of it.70 
B. The Influence of John Locke on American Political Thought 
Locke's direct influence on the formation of the new American gov- 
ernment is evident in many places. The first statement of American gov- 
ernmental principles is the Declaration of Independence, and here 
Locke's impact is ~nmistakable .~~ 
Implicit in the Declaration is the "social compact" theory, that a people 
is a political organization of persons, who, having theretofore lived in a 
"state of nature" without being united by any political bonds, associate 
STATI ADVERSUS BUCHANANUM, BRUTUM, BOUCHERIUM ET RELIQUOS MONARCHOMACHOS 
(1600)); see also S. LAMPRECHT, supra note 41, at 143. 
68. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 8 199, at 416. 
69. The right of revolution, however, was limited by Locke to cases where government had 
actually breached its trust. 
Locke . . . insisted that government was merely the bearer of executive power on trust for 
the community. But in Locke's case remnants of the belief in a contract between the com- 
munity and the government had restricted the right of revolution against the government 
to occasions when government had betrayed its trust or failed in its proper task. 
F. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 153-54 (1966). Moreover, the right of revolution was not exercisable in 
response to isolated acts of tyranny; resistance was authorized only when there was a calculnted 
governmental design to subvert the law. J. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOVER- 
EIGNTY 95 (1978). On the other hand, government's failure to comply with the conditions for its 
existence created not merely a right, but a duty to overthrow the government. See R. AARON, JOHN 
LOCKE 286 (1937); R. LEMOS, supra note 46, at 121-22; A. RANNEY, supra note 34, at 151. 
70. See S. LAMPRECHT, supra note 41, at 146, where the author notes that under Locke's 
theory, the majority of the people create the social compact, so only the majority may dissolve it. No 
- .  . . .  
minority is ever warranted in disturbing the peace of the community by resisting government. Thus, 
the right of revolution is designed, in Locke's view, to deal with the situation where government fails 
- - - - 
to rule within its proper boundaries. Professor Kendall compares the relationship to that of agent 
and principal. 
The relation between the government of the day in Locke's system and the society from 
which it derives its powers is, quite simply, assimilable to that between principal and agent 
in Anglo-American law; and for the government to claim vis-2-vis the society for which it 
acts powers which the society has not entrusted to it would, on Locke's showing, be as 
preposterous as for an agent to claim, vis-2-vis his principal, a freedom to do in the latter's 
name things which the latter does not wish [to be] done. 
W. KENDALL, supra note 46, at 96 (emphasis in original). 
71. See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at 42; see also A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERI- 
CAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 90 (1948). 
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themselves together and bind themselves by compact for the purpose of 
establishing government. It is the voluntary union of individuals that 
creates the "people" or state for secular political purposes, just as under 
the Puritan covenant theory it creates the church for religious 
purposes.72 
The parallel to Locke's political theory is patent. One finds Locke's 
ideas, however, even more directly evidenced in the Declaration. "We 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
compares with Locke's "Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, 
equal and inde~endent."~~ The Declaration's assertion of the people's 
right to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happine~s"~' is traceable to 
Locke's "Life, Liberty and E ~ t a t e . " ~ ~  "[Tlo secure these rights,"77 refer- 
ring to the trilogy of "unalienable" rights, reflects Locke's view of the 
state of nature as understood by Jefferson. Such rights are not "created" 
but rather are "secured" because they antedate government; they are 
rights people enjoy even in the state of nature.78 Finally, the well-known 
phrase "deriving their just powers from the consent of the g~verned"'~ 
corresponds directly to Locke's assertion that "Men are naturally free, 
and the Examples of History shewing, that the Governments of the 
World, that were begun in Peace, had their beginning laid on that foun- 
dation, and were made by the Consent of the People."80 Indeed, Richard 
Henry Lee of Virginia complained that Jefferson had copied the Declara- 
tion from Lo~ke .~ l  Locke's influence on Jefferson is certainly not sur- 
prising, since Jefferson spoke of Locke as one of the three greatest men of 
all time8' and regarded Locke's work as one of the " 'elementary books 
of public right.' "83 
Locke's influence did not stop with Jefferson or his Declaration of 
72. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at  31-32 (footnote omitted). 
73. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
74. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 9 95, at 348. 
75. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
76. J. LOCKE, supra note 23,s 87, at 341. Moreover, the phrase "pursuit of happiness" is said 
to appear in Locke's philosophical writings. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at 60. 
77. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
78. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at  63; see ako J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 6, at  289. 
79. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
80. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, $ 104, at 354 (emphasis in original); see also id. $ 119, at  365-66. 
81. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at 56. "The Declaration of Independence was almost pure 
Locke." Elliott, The Constitution as the American Social Myth, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSID- 
ERED, supra note 32, at 216. One author is kinder to Jefferson than was Mr. Lee: "[Wle would 
hardly know of [Jefferson's] familiarity with John Locke's Two Treatises of Government if he had not 
incorporated passages almost word for word in the Declaration of Independence, apparently una- 
ware that he was doing so." E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE 
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 375 (1975). 
? 82. MacIver, supra note 33, at 52. The other two were Newton and Bacon. Id. 
83. C. WILTSE, THE JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 46 (1935) (quot- 
ing WRITINGS, XVI, 118-19 (May 8, 1825) (Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee)). 
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Independence. Historian Clinton Rossiter notes that Samuel Adams can 
properly be regarded as an intellectual descendant of L o ~ k e , ~ ~  and 
Locke's concept of the state of nature is implicit in Benjamin Franklin's 
views of the American Indian~.'~ Moreover, "[iln his natural-rights as- 
sumptions, his moderation, and his reasonableness, Locke was an intel- 
lectual godparent of James Madison, the Father of the Constituti~n."~~ 
Indeed, the builders of the American government routinely referred to 
Locke's writings with respect and reverence.'' 
Locke's flavor is found as well in documents other than the Declara- 
tion of Independence. His ideas were adopted by a 1774 resolution of the 
North Carolina Assembly asserting that governmental invasion of liber- 
ties was justification for rev~lut ion .~~ Locke's philosophy on revolution 
may well have contributed to the first amendment's provision of the right 
to petition for redress of  grievance^.^^ And while Locke's famous trilogy 
of life, liberty and estateg0 became transmuted to the more popularly 
known life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in 1776,91 it reappeared 
substantially in its original form in the fifth and fourteenth amend- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~  Nor was Locke's influence limited to these three amendments. 
"The blended traditions of Coke and Locke were conveyed into the incip- 
ient stream of American constitutional law by the bills of rights of the 
early State constitutions and by judicial review, which soon after 1800 
became a feature of all of them."93 For example, Professor Elliott traces 
American constitutional structure directly to Locke, either as an inten- 
tional imitation or as a partial reaction to Locke's emphasis on majority 
rule.94 Elliott notes that Locke drew directly from the Magna Carta, 
84. C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 68 (1966). But Adams went beyond 
Locke-he rejected the possibility of tacit consent to government by the governed, insisting instead 
that consent be explicit. MacIver, supra note 33, at 54. 
85. MacIver, supra note 33, at  52. 
86. L. MCDONALD, W ~ R N  P ~ L I ~ ~ A L  THEORY, PART 2: FROM MACHIAVELLI TO 
BURKE 326 (1968). Locke's theory of government was reflected in other colonial thought as well, 
notably the works of James Otis and John Dickenson. See D. MINAR, supra note 31, at 72-76. 
87. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 75-76 (1942). One even finds refer- 
ence to the works of Locke as the subjects of specific testamentary bequests, as was done, for exam- 
ple, by Josiah Quincy in 1774. Id. 
88. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at 104. 
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; E. DUMBAULD, supra note 34, at 104-05. 
90. J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 8 87, at  341. 
91. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 71, at 90; see also Elliott, supra note 81, at 216. 
92. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Actually, Locke's original form was reflected earlier in 
American thought. "The first resolution of the Declaration [of Rights published by Congress in 
1774 was] an echo of John Locke [in providing that] ail men are entitled to life, liberty, and property, 
and that they cannot be deprived of these rights without their consent." R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH 
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 27 (1955). 
93. E. CORWIN, L I B E R ~  AGAINST GOVERNMENT 172 (1948). Professor Minar sees Locke's 
natural rights philosophy carried through the Declaration of Independence into its "most effective 
operational form in the American Bill of Rights." D. MINAR, supra note 31, at 51. 
94. See Elliott, supra note 81, at  217-18; cf. W. KENDALL, supra note 46. 
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which the colonists used to justify the American revolution. Moreover, 
he traces the text of sections nine and ten of article I and all of the Bill of 
Rights directly to Locke's influence. Thus, the Constitution, as well as 
the Declaration of Independence, is traceable to Locke's natural rights 
philosophy-the concept that some rights cannot be alienated by individ- 
uals in forming a government. The Bill of Rights "built upon the ideas of 
that English philosopher whose pioneering work first grappled with the 
fundamentals of society in terms of the balancing of freedom and 
rights-John L o ~ k e . " ~ ~  
Wholly apart from Locke's traceable influence on particular docu- 
ments, American society adopted Locke's view of the relationships be- 
tween governed and government and among the governed themselves. 
Locke's contract analogy was used by eighteenth-century citizens to ex- 
plain these  relationship^,'^ and the system of American government re- 
flects Locke's concept of government as the product of a contract among 
people rather than between rulers and ruled." Americans espoused a 
natural rights philosophy, which became the foundation of the American 
political system. "They endorsed the Lockean theory of a state of nature, 
inalienable natural rights, a social compact, a society rooted in popular 
sovereignty, the consent of the governed, and the right of revolution 
under conditions of intolerable oppres~ion."~~ 
The American political system has, however, modified Locke's 
model by developing two methods of governmental accountability other 
than revolution: the elective process and judicial review.99 The electoral 
process allows the people to replace those exercising government's power 
when the people believe government action is unwise. The judicial pro- 
cess is explicitly reserved to correct governmental actions perceived to be 
u n l a ~ ~ f u l . ' ~  Thus, when government violates the basic statements of 
95. Shotwell, Freedom-Its Histoly and Meaning, in FREEDOM: ITS MEANING 12-13 (R. An- 
shen ed. 1940). 
96. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 289 (1969). 
97. Id. at 601; see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
98. N. RIEMER, THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 101 (1967). 
99. Locke himself emphasized that resort to extra-legal force was not justified so long as re- 
course to law remained. See P. MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADI- 
CALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at  32 (1972). 
100. In fact, the courts explicitly refuse to consider whether governmental acts are wise or  un- 
wise. See, eg., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-92 (1938); 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 
U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905). 
The Constitution "incorporated an instrument which was to reduce the supreme legislature of 
Locke's thinking (and Jefferson's) to the 'creature of the Constitution.' That instrument was, of 
course, the Supreme Court . . . through which the doctrine of judicial review developed." Elliott, 
? supra note 81, at  218. The remaining question, however, concerns who shall speak for the collective 
society in the courts when government acts outside of its powers but not so far as to make revolution 
appropriate. That question will be considered infra in Parts I1 and 111. 
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constitutional principle, the structure of the modified Lockean society 
suggests resort to the courts. In cases where government abuses cannot 
be corrected by resort to the polls, the right to government accountability 
can only be safeguarded by the courts. The next part of this Article, 
therefore, considers the Supreme Court's approach to the right of people 
to challenge unconstitutional government action, a concept dealt with in 
large part under the rubric of standing. 
In recent standing  case^,'^' the Supreme Court has struggled to de- 
velop standards to determine which issues are appropriate for judicial 
resolution. Determining whether a particular matter is fit for judicial 
resolution embraces more than the doctrine of standing to be discussed 
here; it truly concerns the broader concept of justiciability. In Flast v. 
Cohen,lo2 the Court noted: 
[Tlhe judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to 
"cases" and "controversies." . . . Embodied in the words "cases" and 
"controversies" are two complementary but somewhat different limita- 
tions. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to ques- 
tions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed 
as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those 
words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of 
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas com- 
mitted to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of 
art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon fed- 
eral courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine. lo3 
Standing, like the judicial doctrines concerning political questions, 
advisory opinions, and mootness, was created to limit judicial power to 
cases in which adversarial presentation is possible and legislative or exec- 
utive prerogatives are not infringed. lo4 The exact contours of these doc- 
trines limiting justiciability, however, are by no means clear;lo5 they 
involve "a blend of constitutional requirements and policy 
considerations." lo6 
Standing concerns whether the party seeking to invoke the judicial 
101. For purposes of this Article, "recent" refers to cases beginning with Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83 (1968), after which, this Article suggests, the problems with traditional standing began to 
appear forcefully. 
102. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
103. Id. at 94-95. 
104. Id. at 95. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 97; see also supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
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power is the appropriate party to do so. "The fundamental aspect of 
standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before 
a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adj~dicated."'~' 
Doctrines other than standing focus on the issues. Thus, though a plain- 
tiff may have standing, the courts may decline to adjudicate his case be- 
cause it raises a political question or is moot.'08 Conversely, the courts 
may refuse to adjudicate otherwise justiciable matters on the ground that 
the plaintiff lacks standing.'Og This Part will focus on the latter category 
of cases. Many of the cases falling into this category present the trou- 
bling prospect of issues that are, or should be, justiciable but for which 
no potential plaintiff exists. This Part will also compare these cases with 
contemporaneous cases in which plaintiffs were found to have standing 
to determine whether there are principled differences between the two 
groups. 
A. Denials of Standing 
1. The Early 1970's 
In Sierra Club v. Morton,"' the Supreme Court considered an envi- 
ronmental protection suit brought by the Sierra Club against the Secre- 
tary of the Interior challenging the proposed development and use of 
certain federal lands. While the Court found that aesthetic injury was 
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing,"' it nonetheless dismissed the 
action for lack of standing because the Sierra Club, apparently for tacti- 
cal reasons, chose not to allege harm to specific club members or individ- 
u a l ~ . " ~  The Court required the party seeking standing to allege "more 
107. Flost, 392 U.S. at 99; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972). 
108. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (declaring the controversy moot de- 
spite plaintiffs standing); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (political question); Pacific States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (political question). 
109. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), discussed infra in notes 110-16 and 
accompanying text. 
110. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
11 1. Id. at 734. The Court treated the case as one of first impression, noting that its prior cases 
did not address "the question, which has arisen with increasing frequency in federal courts in recent 
years, as to what must be alleged by persons who claim injury of a noneconomic nature to interests 
that are widely shared." Id. 
112. Thus, it is possible to read Sierra Club narrowly as a case involving a defect in pleading 
rather than announcing any new ideas about standing. While as a technical matter this may be 
correct, such a reading ignores what was truly going on in Sierra Club. Certainly a broad reading of 
the complaint, as encouraged by FED. R. CIV. P. 8 0 ,  see, ag., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957); United States v. White County Bridge Comm'n, 275 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 818 (1960), would have permitted the inference that the required individualized injury existed, 
particularly in light of one paragraph of the complaint, which the Court felt compelled to quote 
before disregarding. 
"Plaintiff Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation . . . [with] approximately 78,000 [mem- 
bers] nationally . . . . For many years the Sierra Club by its activities and conduct has 
exhibited a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national 
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than an injury to a cognizable interest . . . . [Tlhe party seeking review 
[must] be himself among the injured."' l 3  Although the Court recognized 
the public interest aspect of the Sierra Club's ~omplaint,"~ it was unwill- 
ing to recognize such a "public action" unless the public's representa- 
tive-the plaintiff-alleged personal harm. ' l5 In so holding, the Court 
made it clear that the concept of a plaintiff acting as the public's repre- 
sentative might still be viable, but not in the absence of some allegation of 
individual injury to the would-be repre~entative."~ 
In 1973, the Court turned its attention from injury-in-fact and ex- 
panded the scope of the nexus test in Linda R.S. v. Richard 0. '" There, 
the mother of an illegitimate child challenged Texas' practice of refusing 
to enforce its penal statute addressing nonsupport of children against 
parents of illegitimate children. The plaintiff asserted that the state's 
practice denied her child equal protection. The Court affirmed the dis- 
trict court's dismissal of the case on standing grounds. Justice Marshall, 
writing for the majority, readily conceded that the plaintiff had satisfied 
the injury-in-fact requirement, but held that she had failed to satisfy the 
parks, game refuges and forests of the country, regularly serving as a responsible represen- 
tative of persons similarly interested. One of the principal purposes of Sierra Club is to 
protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Its interests 
would be vitally affected by the acts hereinafter described and would be aggrieved by those 
acts of the defendants as hereinafter more fully appears." 
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8 (quoting complaint at 1 3). At the same time, the Court specifically 
noted the possibility of the Sierra Club amending its complaint after remand to the district court. Id. 
at  736 n.8. Professor Nichol observes that the same sort of inversion of the normal pleading rules 
can be seen in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490 (1975). Nichol, supra note 27, at 72 n.25. Simon and Warrh are discussed itgra in 
notes 159-78 and accompanying text. 
Justice White is reported to have been especially exasperated with plaintiffs' failure or refusal to 
prepare themselves to meet the standing question. " 'Why didn't the Sierra Club have one goddnmn 
member walk through the park and then there would have been standing to sue,' White remarked, 
before joining the four-member majority." B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 164 
n.* (1979). 
113. Sierra CIub, 405 U.S. at 734-35. 
114. Id. at  736-37. 
115. The Court also noted, id. at 736 n.9, with apparent disapproval that the Second Circuit hnd 
recognized representative standing of the type asserted by the Sierra Club in Citizens Comm. for the 
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). 
116. The Court's reliance upon the injury-in-fact test reflected earlier standing decisions, nota- 
bly Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). FIasr, in fact, sets 
out what is now taken as the basic framework of standing inquiry by delineating the two-part test for 
standing. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. The Court insisted on an allegntion of 
individual injury even though it favorably noted the emerging trend toward recognition of 
noneconomic injuries as appropriate predicates for standing. 
m h e  interest alleged to have been injured "may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and rec- 
reational' as well as economic values." But broadening the categories of injury that may be 
alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that 
the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury. 
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 154 (1970)). 
117. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
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nexus test."* Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff had not 
demonstrated either that the absence of support payments resulted from 
nonenforcement of the penal law section, or that enforcement, if ordered, 
would cause support payments to begin.llg Thus, the majority was not 
satisfied that the plaintiffs injury resulted from violation of the constitu- 
tional right on which she based her complaint. 
The Court next denied standing in United States v. Richardson120 
and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War.121 In 
Richardson, a taxpayer sought to have the Central Intelligence Agency 
declared unconstitutional because it allegedly permitted a type of 
accounting for funds inconsistent with the requirements of the accounta- 
bility ~ 1 a u s e . l ~ ~  The Court, in a five-to-four decision, ruled that Richard- 
son had no standing.124 Although the plaints sued as a taxpayer, he 
failed the nexus test125 because his attack on the CIA's practice was not 
based on the taxing and spending power.126 The Court, therefore, found 
that Richardson was "seeking 'to employ a federal court as a forum in 
which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of 
government.' " 12' 
The majority did not rest on the nexus ground alone; it went on to 
118. Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. 
119. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618. Justice White took issue with the majority's lack of faith in 
the salutary effect of threatened penal sanctions. 
I had always thought our civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had 
something more than a "speculative" effect on a person's conduct. . . . Certainly Texas 
does not share the Court's surprisingly novel view. It  assumes that criminal sanctions are 
useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support obligations to their legitimate children. 
Id. at 621 (White, J., dissenting). 
120. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
121. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
122. 50 U.S.C. $8 403a-403j (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 9, cl. 7: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse- 
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." 
Before suing, Richardson had sought copies of the CIA's financial statements from the Govern- 
ment Printing Office, which referred his request to the Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of 
the Department of the Treasury. That office provided him some general records of expenditures, but 
reported that it had no information specifically relating to CIA expenditures. Richardson thereupon 
asked the Treasury Department to seek the Attorney General's opinion of the constitutionality of the 
CIA Act, and only upon the Department's refusal to do so was the action commenced. Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 168. 
124. The district court had dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Third Circuit, sitting 
en banc, reversed with three judges dissenting. Of the majority in that court, three judges found that 
Richardson had taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); and one judge found 
that he had citizen standing. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc), 
rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
125. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. 
126. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175; see U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 1. 
127. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)). 
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explain that Richardson could not demonstrate injury-in-fact from the 
challenged practice. 
"It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke 
the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative 
action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient 
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the 
The Court declined to recognize Richardson's interest as differentiable 
from that of any other member of the public. If there was any injury, the 
Court refused to find that Richardson was harmed more than anyone 
else.'29 Thus, the majority found that Richardson failed to satisfy any 
part of the test for standing. In this respect, Richardson echoed the insis- 
tence of Sierra Club that the plaintiff must plead and be prepared to 
prove injury to himself as an individual, obviously an impossibility in the 
sort of case Richardson brought. At the same time, the Court purported 
not to leave Richardson remediless. "In a very real sense," the Court 
held, "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these 
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is commit- 
ted to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political pro- 
c e ~ s . " ' ~ ~  The plaintiff, therefore, was admonished to take his case to the 
ballot box, 13' an idea repeated in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to 
Stop the War.'32 
In Schlesinger, several members and former members of military re- 
serve units who were opposed to the war in Viet Nam challenged the 
constitutionality of members of Congress holding commissions in the 
military reserves. 133 In an analysis similar to that in Richardson, a six-to- 
128. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Ex parre Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam) (emphasis 
supplied by the Richardson Court)). 
129. The Court relied explicitly on Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Levitt, a member of 
the Supreme Court Bar, challenged Justice Black's elevation to the bench on the ground that 
Justices' retirement benefits had been increased while Justice Black served as Senator from Alabama, 
and that his appointment therefore violated the ineligibility clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 6, cl. 2: 
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any 
civil Office under the Authority of the United States, . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been 
encreased during such time. . . ." The Court, per curiam, found Levitt without standing and de- 
clined to consider the matter further. 
130. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
131. There are several problems with the Court's suggested political substitute for judicial intcr- 
vention. See infra notes 307-27 and accompanying text. 
132. 418 U.S. 208,227 (1974): "Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the 
political processes." 
133. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a Congressman's membership in the 
reserves violated the incompatibility clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[Nlo Person holding any 
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Of- 
fice"). In addition, the plaintiffs sought an injunction barring the Secretary of Defense from enrolling 
any member of Congress in the reserves and directing the Secretary to strike from the reserve rolls 
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three found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The majority 
affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiffs lacked standing as tax- 
payer~,'~' but overturned its conclusion that they had standing as 
citizens. 1 3 ~  
The Court focused upon the plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate any 
injury-in-fact or any individual interest differentiable from that of the 
citizenry generally.13' The majority noted that recent cases had broad- 
ened standing by expanding the concept of judicially cognizable in- 
but declined to regard that trend as an abandonment of the 
injury-in-fact test.13' " 'Abstract injury is not enough.' "la The Court 
concluded by discussing the policy reasons for refusing to recognize citi- 
zen standing: 
All citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of 
each branch of Government. In some fashion, every provision of the 
Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a generalized 
interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a "case or controversy" 
appropriate for judicial resolution. The proposition that all constitu- 
tional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens 
are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.141 
Therefore, as in Richardson, the Court found the political process was 
any member of Congress then enrolled, to discharge any Reservist subsequently elected to Congress, 
and to recover any pay given to members of Congress as Reservists. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 211. 
134. Justice Stewart moved from the dissent in Richardson into the majority in Schlesinger, 
explaining in the latter that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the defendants had refused to 
perform an affirmative duty under the Constitution and that, in such circumstances, none of the 
petitioners could demonstrate injury-in-fact. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228-29 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
135. Id. at 215-16. The plaintiffs had asserted four bases for standing in the district court: as 
persons opposed to the United States' involvement in Viet Nam; as officers and enlisted personnel of 
the reserves who were not members of Congress; as taxpayers; and as citizens. The district court 
upheld standing only on the citizen theory. See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. 
Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), a f d  mem., 495 F.2d 1075 @.C. Cir. 1972), rev'dsub nom Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
136. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 224. 
137. Id. at 217. The Court noted that this sort of generalized grievance had been rejected as a 
basis for taxpayer standing. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)). The Court has never 
explained why the fact that all citizens might wish to challenge governmental conduct inconsistent 
with the Constitution logically suggests a finding of no standing. 
138. Id. at 218 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 
154 (1970)). 
139. Id. at 218-19 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)). 
140. Id. at 219 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)). The Court also re- 
garded Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), as long-standing authority for this proposition. See 
supra note 129. 
141. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 226-27 (footnote omitted). This Article suggests that citizen stand- 
ing is appropriate in cases like Schlesinger and proposes a theory of standing that does have bounda- 
ries. See infra Part 111, Section C. 
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the appropriate remedy.142 
The Richardson dissenters were quick to note the implications of the 
Court's ruling. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that 
Richardson was a typical Hohfeldian plaintiff, seeking to exercise his 
right to receive information and to compel the government to fulfill its 
corresponding duty to supply it.143 Indeed, Justice Stewart pointed out 
that if the government had owed Richardson money rather than informa- 
tion, no one would have questioned his standing. "I see no reason for a 
different result when the defendant is a Government official and the as- 
serted duty relates not to the payment of money, but to the disclosure of 
items of inf~rmation."'~~ Justice Stewart, therefore, would have found 
that whenever government owes an affirmative duty under the Constitu- 
tion, injury-in-fact is established by the nonperformance of that duty. 
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Schlesinger, would also have found 
standing based on both citizenship and taxpayer status.'45 Referring to 
the injury-in-fact requirement, he noted: 
We have insisted that more than generalized grievances of a citizen be 
shown, that he must have a "personal stake in the outcome." . . . But 
that "personal stake" need not be a monetary one. In Baker v. Carr it 
was the right to vote, an important badge of citizenship. The "personal 
stake" in the present case is keeping the Incompatibility Clause an opera- 
tive force in the Government by freeing the entanglement of the federal 
bureaucracy with the Legislative  ranch.'^^ 
Justice Douglas, therefore, would have held each citizen's interest in the 
proper operation of government-an interest that the Schlesinger major- 
ity regarded as too abstract to be judicially cognizable-sufficient to sup- 
port standing.14' 
Justice Marshall also would have found citizen standing in 
Schlesinger. Marshall noted that the incompatibility clause was intended 
142. Seesupra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 307-27 and accompany- 
ing text. 
143. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 203 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 15 
(1913) and Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigont in Public Actions: The Holrfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968)). For Hohfeld, a plaintiff could bring suit only if he was vindicating 
a right for which there was a correlative duty owed him by the defendant. 
144. Id. at 203 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
145. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 232 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
146. Id. at 234 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
147. Justice Douglas distinguished Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), the case challenging 
Justice Black's appointment to the bench, see supra note 129, on the ground that standing had been 
denied there because the injury claimed under the incompatibility clause was too speculative, since it 
involved retirement benefits that might never accrue rather than salary. He noted that Justice Blnck 
never received any retirement benefits. at 234-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Whether this distinction is persuasive is 
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to avoid conflicts of interest.14' In his view, the plaintiffs' complaint did 
not necessarily reflect the interests of all citizens in having government 
abide by the Constitution. Rather, the complaint concerned the plain- 
tiffs' first amendment right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances and to have a government free of conflicts of interest when it 
considered such ~ e t i t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  Thus, Marshall found injury-in-fact to be a 
specific constitutional right and distinguished this injury from the ab- 
stract complaint that the majority found to be insufficient to sustain 
standing. 
Justice Brennan, in a dissent addressed to both Schlesinger and 
Ri~hardson,''~ would have found standing in each. As to Richardson, 
Justice Brennan argued that injury-in-fact was established because 
Richardson had a personal right to receive the budget information con- 
cerning the CIA.'" And in Schlesinger, he would have found injury-in- 
fact by reason of plaintiffs' taxpayer  tatu us.''^ 
Addressing the nexus requirement, Justice Brennan argued that it 
was not properly a part of standing analysis: 
The Court's further inquiry, in each of these cases, into the connection 
between "the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute 
or constitutional guarantee in question," . . . and the "interest sought to 
be protected by the complainant," . . . is relevant, not to "standing" but, 
if at all, only to such limitations on exercise of the judicial function as 
justiciability . . . or reviewability. . . 
Justice Brennan thus viewed injury-in-fact as the only test for standing. 
Thus, although a substantial minority of the Court had articulated 
preferences for a broader concept of standing in public actions, by the 
mid-1970's the Court had developed two distinct approaches using stand- 
ing to restrict access to the courts. The first, exemplified by Sierra Club 
v. Morton and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,'" 
focused upon a plaintiffs failure or inability to plead sufficient injury-in- 
fact distinguishable from some generalized loss suffered by the public at 
large. The second, exemplified by United States v. Richard~on,"~ denied 
148. Scltlesirger, 418 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
149. Id. at 239-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. at 235 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Stewart. 
See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
152. Scl~lesinger, 418 U.S. at 236-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For that reason he declined to 
discuss whether the majority-rejected concept of citizen standing was appropriate. Id. at 237 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan did not indicate 
when he abandoned the Flast nexus requirement. In Flast, he had joined the Court's opinion. See 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
154. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
155. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text. 
156. 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text. 
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standing because the plaintiff failed to show a sufficient nexus between 
the harm he suffered and the constitutional right under which protection 
was claimed.I5' The distinction between these two approaches is impor- 
tant. By the Court's own analysis, a finding of no injury-in-fact is a con- 
stitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction, whereas failure to meet the 
nexus requirement establishes only a prudential impediment to federal 
court action.I5' The cases of the early 1970's focused far more on the 
first approach, a constitutional test that bodes ill for broader concepts of 
standing. 
2. Standing in the Mid-1970's 
In Warth v. Seldin,'59 the Court employed both the injury-in-fact 
and nexus tests, but it did so more restrictively than in Sierra Club or 
Richardson. Warth was brought by a kaleidoscope of  plaintiff^'^^ chal- 
lenging a suburban zoning ordinance on the ground that it was tailored 
to exclude low- and moderate-income persons in violation of the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871.16' A bitterly divided Court held that 
none of the plaintiffs had standing. With respect to the low-income 
plaintiffs, the Court noted that although they had pleaded deliberate ex- 
clusion of low-income racial and ethnic minority groups by the zoning 
ordinance, the plaintiffs had not pleaded that they had been personally 
excluded. The Court held that the complaint, therefore, failed to plead 
the individual injury required under the Constitution to confer stand- 
ing.I6' The individual plaintiffs in Warth had pleaded injury to the group 
157. Richardson, of course, involved both approaches; the Court found that the plaintiff had 
satisfied neither the injury-in-fact test nor the nexus test. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying 
text. 
158. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. Thus, in cases where the Court finds no 
injury-in-fact, one must either take issue with the Court's definition and application of that term or 
dispute the theory that the injury-in-fact requirement is based on article 111's case and controversy 
language and is therefore jurisdictional. This Article urges the first of these two approaches. See 
infra Part 111. The nexus requirement, by contrast, may be opposed either, as Professor Tribe has 
done, on the ground that it serves to deny standing when a decision on the merits would be prefera- 
ble, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text, or on other nonconstitutional grounds, see ittjro 
Part 111, Section A. 
159. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
160. The plaintiff group included low-income individuals desiring to move to the suburb; urban 
taxpayers claiming that their taxes were higher because the zoning ordinance caused the city to have 
more low-income residents in need of municipal services; a not-for-profit corporation formed to 
foster low-income housing opportunities; and several builders and housing associations who asserted 
an interest in creation of low-income housing in the suburb. Id. at 493-97, 503. 
161. Id. at 493; see Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (1982). 
162. Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-05. The Warth plaintiffs had sued as representatives of a class, id. 
at 493 n.1, which presumably encompassed individuals who had been excluded. The Court, how- 
ever, found that the absence of personal injury to the named individuals precluded them from relying 
upon injury to others, id. at 502-05 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) and Bailey v. 
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of which they were members, unlike the plaintiff in Sierra Club,163 but 
the Court still found the pleading insufficient because the plaintiffs had 
not pleaded injury traceable to particular individuals. Warth, therefore, 
seemed to deny standing in a situation in which the Sierra Club Court 
apparently would not have. The Court, though recognizing that the de- 
- - - 
Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962)), and thus implicitly held that such plaintiffs would not satisfy the 
typicality requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
During the 1970's and early 1980's, the Court developed a variation on the Sierra Club and 
Warth theme of inability to show personal injury. Under the variation, the Court looked to the 
likelihood of future personal injury in cases where the plaintiff sought injunctive, as opposed to legal, 
relief. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the plaintiff had been 
stopped for a traffic violation. He asserted that though he had not resisted, he had been choked by 
the arresting officer, causing him to lose consciousness and to suffer damage to his larynx. Id. at 97- 
98. Evidence showed that Los Angeles police officers were trained in the use of two types of 
chokehold, id. at 97 n.1, that the officers were permitted to use chokeholds even when they were not 
threatened with injury or resistance, id. at  99, and that 16 persons had died from chokeholds applied 
by Los Angeles police officers. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against future police use of such chokeholds. 
The Court held that the federal courts could not grant equitable relief because Lyons was unable to 
show any likelihood that he would be choked again, and therefore had not shown injury-in-fact. Id. 
at 105-06. Thus, the Court made clear that unless the government were to establish an unconstitu- 
tional policy in terms general enough to apply with certainty to any plaintiff, injunctive relief would 
never be available because a plaintiff would be unable to show a sufficient likelihood of future harm 
to him, even though it might be obvious that such harm would occur to large numbers of people. See 
id. This result, according to the majority, was not new doctrine; it merely reflected the Court's 
earlier decisions in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 
(1974), both of which involved challenges to official practices alleged to be unconstitutional and 
racially motivated. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102-05. 
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, charged that the 
majority's reliance upon O'Shea and Rizzo was misplaced because neither case had involved specific 
plaintiffs' allegations of past injury to themselves in addition to the need for prospective equitable 
relief. Id. at 113, 123-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also assailed the Court for 
"fragmenting the standing inquiry and imposing a separate standing hurdle with respect to each 
form of relief sought." Id. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the Court should focus 
instead upon whether a plaintiff has standing to litigate a claim, as distinct from whether, having 
presented his claim, he is entitled to a particular form of relief. Id. Finally, Justice Marshall pointed 
out that the federal courts were powerless in a constitutional system restrained by a Lyons concept of 
standing: 
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional violations from the equitable 
powers of a federal court. It  immunizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that 
authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can es- 
tablish with substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured again, in the future. 
The CHIEF JUSTICE asked in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
. . . (1971) (dissenting opinion), "what would be the judicial response to a police order 
authorizing 'shoot to kill' with respect to every fugitive?" His answer was that it would be 
"easy to predict our collective wrath and outrage." We now learn that wrath and outrage 
cannot be translated into an order to cease the unconstitutional practice, but only an award 
of damages to those who are victimized by the practice and live to sue and to the survivors 
of those who are not so fortunate. Under the view expressed by the majority today, if the 
police adopt a policy of "shoot to kill," or a policy of shooting 1 out of 10 suspects, the 
federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation. . . . The federal judical power 
is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic constitutional violation. 
Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
163. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying 
text. 
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fendant's actions might have increased housing costs in the suburb, also 
refused to find a causal link between those actions and the plaintiffs' ex- 
~ 1 u s i o n . l ~ ~  Finally, the majority characterized the harm to the individual 
plaintiffs as too speculative and remote. 
Regarding the taxpayer plaintiffs, the Court found that even were 
they able to satisfy the injury-in-fact test,166 they would be relying upon 
violations of the rights of others who were discriminated against in hous- 
ing rather than upon their own rights. The Court found that the taxpay- 
ers failed the nexus test.16' Similar reasoning was used to deny standing 
to the associations claiming that the exclusion of certain groups from the 
suburb caused them economic injury.168 Finally, the Court found that 
the builders association, which sought damages, alleged no pecuniary 
loss to itself and could not recover on behalf of its members. Its claim for 
prospective relief was barred because there were no allegations of current 
building projects being frustrated by the zoning 0 r d i n a n ~ e . I ~ ~  Thus, the 
Court used the two-part test to deny standing to all of the  plaintiff^.'^^ 
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky WeIfare Rights Organi~at ion '~~ contin- 
ued the Court's increasingly restrictive view of standing by requiring that 
the causal link between government's wrongful act and plaintiff's injury 
be precisely pleaded. The plaintiff, a coalition of indigent individuals 
seeking hospital care and organizations representing indigents' interests, 
164. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-07. 
165. Id. at 507. 
166. Id. at 509. The taxpayer plaintiffs asserted that the exclusion of low- and middle-income 
residents from the suburb placed a greater burden on the municipality to provide tax abatements for 
low- and moderate-cost housing. This, in turn, was alleged to increase the tax burden of city resi- 
dents in order to finance essential public services. Id. at 508-09. 
167. Id. at 509-10. 
168. Id. at 512-14. 
169. Id. at 515-17. In this respect, the Court paralleled its treatment of Sierra Club's claim in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
170. Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that three of the groups of plaintiffs clearly had stand- 
ing. Warth, 422 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting). First, he would have granted standing to the 
low-income and minority plaintiffs because their complaint alleged sufficient, specific instances of 
concrete injury suffered as a result of the exclusionary practices of defendants. Id. at 523-26 (Bren- 
nan, J., dissenting). Second, with respect to the two organizational plaintiffs, he would have found 
their "allegations of past injury, which members of both these organizations have clearly made, and 
of a future intent, if the barriers are cleared, again to develop suitable housing" sufficient to demon- 
strate the "requisite personal stake in the outcome of rhis controversy." Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Justice Brennan then pointed out that in order to deny standing, the majority had demanded 
first, that the low-income and minority plaintiffs plead an unprecedented, "unachievable specificity" 
in showing the nexus between defendants' actions and plaintiffs' alleged injury, id. at 528 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting), and second, that the organizational plaintiffs "allege the (economically) impossi- 
blel'-specific concrete injuries with respect to a particular, current project, id. at 530 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that the Court's disposition of the case reflected its unex- 
pressed feelings on the merits more than it reflected any principled analysis of standing concepts. 
See infra note 263. 
171. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
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challenged a newly modified Internal Revenue Service ruling that alleg- 
edly encouraged hospitals to refuse care to indigent patients while al- 
lowing the hospitals to retain their status as charitable organizations. 
The organization argued that the ruling violated congressional intent em- 
bodied in the Internal Revenue Code's provision exempting charitable 
organizations from taxation. The Court held that the organization 
lacked standing on the narrow but significant ground that it had failed to 
establish that the revenue ruling had caused the hospitals to deny treat- 
ment to its mernber~."~ The plaintiff was, therefore, unable to demon- 
strate that a favorable judgment would redress the harm that its 
members had suffered.'73 
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on the ground that the 
plaintiff had failed to show that the hospitals denying the plaintiff coali- 
tion's members treatment were within the ambit of the modification 
wrought by the challenged r ~ 1 i n g . l ~ ~  But he sharply criticized what he 
viewed as an addition to the injury-in-fact test by the majority: 
Nothing in the logic or policy of constitutionally required standing is 
added by the further injury-in-fact dimension required by the Court to- 
day-that respondents allege that the hospitals affecting them would not 
have elected to forgo the favorable tax treatment and that this would 
"result in the availability to respondents of' free or below-cost medical 
services. 175 
Thus, Justice Brennan repudiated the heightened causality requirement 
used by the Court in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.176 
172. Id. at 41-43. "It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the com- 
plaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by 
the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id. at 42-43. 
The problem in Simon was not one of pleading, as Justice Brennan made clear in his concurring 
opinion. Defendants sought summary judgment on the question of standing, specifically attacking 
the causation question. Id. at 53 (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan noted, 
At this point in the litigation, it was clearly incumbent upon the respondents to make a 
showing sufficient to create a material issue of fact whether there was any connection be- 
tween the hospitals affecting them and the Ruling alleged to be illegally "encouraging" tax- 
exempt hospitals to withdraw the provision of indigents' services, thereby injuring respon- 
dents' "opportunity and ability" for such services. . . . No such showing was made. 
There is absolutely no indication in the record that the contested Ruling altered the opera- 
tion of these hospitals in any way . . . . 
Id. at 53-54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
173. In this respect, the Court echoed its opinion in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
617-18 (1973). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
174. Simon, 426 U.S. at 47-50, 53-54 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
175. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was referring to the majority's asser- 
tion that: 
[i]t is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this 
suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services. So far as the complaint 
sheds light, it is just as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents may apply for 
service would elect to forgo favorable tax treatment . . . . 
Id. at 43. 
176. 410 U.S. 614 (1973); see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
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It  is unclear in the aftermath of Simon whether the new twist to the 
injury-in-fact test that Justice Brennan criticized has actually become a 
permanent part of constitutional concepts of standing. Certainly the new 
factor was not necessary to the decision in Simon, and therefore it may be 
regarded as dictum.'77 If so, however, it was the dictum of at least six 
members of the C o ~ r t , " ~  and thus it may play a role in future decisions. 
3. Standing to Raise Fourth Amendment Claims 
Beginning in 1978, the Court decided a series of fourth amendment 
cases that radically changed the concept of standing in that area. The 
seminal case was Rakas v. Illinois,179 where passengers in a vehicle that 
was stopped and searched were held to lack standing under the fourth 
amendment to challenge the search. The Court eviscerated a doctrine 
under which anyone legitimately on searched private premises had stand- 
ing to challenge the search.lS0 Instead, the Court said that the standing 
inquiry was whether the defendant's own fourth amendment right of pri- 
vacy had been invaded by the search.lS1 At the same time, the majority, 
led by Justice Rehnquist, announced that the vocabulary of standing 
would no longer be used in fourth amendment cases. 
[Tlhe question necessarily arises whether it serves any useful analytical 
purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing, distinct from the 
merits of a defendant's Fourth Amendment claim. . . . [W]e think the 
better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defend- 
ant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti- 
cally separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.Is2 
Despite this language, Justice Rehnquist insisted that the new approach 
would result in no doctrinal change.ls3 Nonetheless, Rakas had the ef- 
fect of denying standing to a defendant who clearly would have had it in 
prior years. 
177. The plaintiffs failed to show that the hospitals had refused service because of the ruling and 
not because of other factors. Since they made no such showing of causality, plaintiffs lacked stand- 
ing. Therefore, the Court never had to examine, under some heightened causality requirement, 
whether the hospitals would actually provide the services if the ruling were overturned rather than 
deny the services and forgo the tax advantages. See also Allen v. Wright, 105 S. Ct. 51 (1984), in 
which the Court reiterated the reasoning of Simon, again as  dictum, in denying standing to parcnts 
of black school children seeking to challenge Internal Revenue Service tax-exempt status conferred 
upon allegedly discriminatory private schools. 
178. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's concurrence. Justice Stevens did not participate 
in the case. Simon, 426 U.S. at 28. 
179. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
180. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,265-67 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). 
181. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-40. 
182. Id. at 138-39. 
183. Id. at 139. 
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The trend begun in Rakas continued in United States v. S a l v u c ~ i , ~ ~ ~  
Rawlings v. K e n t u ~ k y , ' ~ ~  and United States v. Payner,lS6 each of which 
denied defendants standing to challenge fourth amendment searches that 
they would have been able to attack before Rakas.18' Review of these 
cases makes it clear that Rakas, Salvucci, Rawlings, and Payner all had 
demonstrated injury-in-fact: the government proposed to introduce ma- 
terial seized in contravention of the fourth amendment in evidence 
against the defendants. The Court denied standing, however, because it 
found that the defendants were asserting someone else's fourth amend- 
ment privacy interest, not their own.e88 In essence, the Court raised the 
same objection to standing in the fourth amendment context as in Warth 
v. Seldin:lg9 defendants in the fourth amendment cases were said to lack 
standing because they could not connect the injury they unquestionably 
suffered with a personal constitutional right. In this sense, they failed to 
satisfy the nexus test.lgO Close reading of the fourth amendment stand- 
ing cases reveals that the Court has retreated to use of the legally-pro- 
tected-interest test, which it had repudiated explicitly in 1970 in 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.lgl Indeed, 
this may be the reason that Justice Rehnquist was so eager to abandon 
standing terminology in fourth amendment standing cases; to do other- 
wise wouId have made the inconsistency clearer.192 
4. The Decision in Valley Forge 
The Court's most recent consideration of taxpayer and citizen 
standing came in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, 1 r ~ c . l ~ ~  The Court denied standing to a 
nonprofit taxpayer organization and four of its employees who argued 
184. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
185. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
186. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
187. For a detailed description of these cases, see Doernberg, supra note 29; see also Burkoff, 
Tlre Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary 
Doctritze, 58 OR. L. REV. 151 (1979); Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing Afier Rakas v. 
Illinois: From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1981). 
188. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 
(1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 
(1978); accord Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) ("What petitioners appear to 
assert is an independent constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth Amendment."). 
189. 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. 
191. 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970); see infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text. Justice Bren- 
nan interprets Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), as having abandoned this legally-protected-inter- 
est test. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
192. See generally Burkoff, supra note 187; Doernberg, supra note 29; Mickenberg, supra note 
187. 
193. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
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that conveyance of a parcel of land by the federal government to Valley 
Forge Christian College violated the establishment clause. The five-to- 
four majority held that, although plaintiffs had alleged " 'depriv[ation] of 
the fair and constitutional use of [their] tax dollar,' "Ig4 they nonetheless 
had failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact.lg5 
The Court based its conclusion on two grounds. First, the Court 
seemed to return to the limitation on taxpayer standing first announced 
in Frothingham v. MeIIon. lg6 It limited Flast v. Cohen,lg7 a case allowing 
taxpayer standing, to challenges of congressional, rather than executive, 
action.19* Second, the Court found that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, were 
not challenging any exercise of power under the taxing and spending 
clause'99 (as was the case in Flast), but rather were objecting to the sub- 
sequent disposition of property that the plaintiffs conceded the govern- 
ment had lawfully acquired through expenditure of tax funds.200 
The majority also attacked the lower court's decision to allow the 
plaintiffs standing as citizens. The Third Circuit had noted that the 
plaintiffs' real interest was not as taxpayers, but as persons interested in 
maintaining the rigorous separation of church and state.201 The majority 
sharply criticized the assertion that the plaintiffs had shown sufficient 
violation of personal constitutional rights rather than generalized citizen 
grievances, which the Court in the past had found insufficient to confer 
standing. 
194. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 476 (quoting Respondent's Amended Complaint at app. 10). 
195. Id. at 485. 
196. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
197. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
198. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at  479. In dissent, Justice Brennan took sharp issue with this read- 
ing of Flast, accusing the majority of "wrenching snippets of language from our opinions," and of 
creating "tortuous distinctions . . . [that] are specious, at best: at worst, . . . pernicious to our 
constitutional heritage." Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He went on to rebuke the Court for 
artificially limiting Flast to challenges of Congressional power, noting that in Flast, the plaintiffs 
challenged executive action of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to au- 
thority granted by Congress, precisely as in Valley Forge. Id. 
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1. 
200. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480 & n.17. 
201. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. 
& Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The Supreme Court 
majority relied upon the Court of Appeals' own opinion to support the majority's argument that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to standing as taxpayers. The Court of Appeals had analyzed plaintill's' 
true interest, cutting through the verbiage imposed upon them by previous standing cases to deal 
explicitly with their actual concern. 
Plaintiffs have no reason to expect, nor perhaps do they care about, any personal tax saving 
that might result should they prevail. The crux of the interest at stake, the plaintiffs argue, 
is found in the Establishment Clause, not in the supposed loss of money, as such. As a 
matter of primary identity, therefore, the plaintiffs are not so much taxpayers as separa- 
tionists . . . . 
619 F.2d at 261. 
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This reasoning process merely disguises, we think with a rather thin veil, 
the inconsistency of the [lower] court's results with our decisions in 
Schlesinger and Richardson. . . . [Alssertion of a right to a particular 
kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by act- 
ing differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. I11 without 
draining those requirements of rneaning2O2 
At the same time, the majority recognized the possibility that under its 
analysis, cases might arise in which no one would have standing. 
Respondents' claim of standing implicitly rests on the presumption that 
violations of the Establishment Clause typically will not cause injury [to 
anyone] sufficient to confer standing under the "traditional" view of Art. 
111. But "[tlhe assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, 
no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."'03 
This Article suggests, contrary to the Court's implication, that the ab- 
sence of standing for any possible plaintiff is indeed a matter for concern. 
Such an absence of possible plaintiffs may not, of course, by itself be a 
reason to allow standing. It is, however, a matter of some gravity if situ- 
ations exist where the government may, with impunity, violate the Con- 
stitution because no one is able to challenge the government's action in 
Justice Brennan's vehement dissent traced the development of tax- 
payer standing doctrine and then argued that rights under the establish- 
ment clause are personal rights specifically designed, at least in part, to 
protect taxpayers.205 Brennan also criticized Frothingham v. M e l l ~ n , ~ ~ ~  
the seminal taxpayer standing case. He questioned its "obscure" reason- 
ing and implicitly challenged Frothingham's reliance upon the indirect- 
ness of the connection between the taxpayer's remittance and the 
government's e~penditure.'~' "Frothingham also stressed the indirect- 
ness of the taxpayer's injury. But, as a matter of Art. 111 standing, if the 
causal relationship is sufficiently certain, the length of the causal chain is 
irrelevant."208 
In fact, Justice Brennan noted that Frothingham contained an "un- 
stated premise," which had been identified in Justice Harlan's Flast dis- 
sent: the notion that taxpayer standing, if it existed at all, should be 
based on citizens' generalized grievances concerning government actions, 
-- - - - - - - 
202. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483. 
203. Id. at 489 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 
(1974)). 
204. See generally infra Part 111. 
205. Val/ey Forge, 454 U.S. at 500-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "It is clear . . . that one of the 
primary purposes of the Establishment Clause was to prevent the use of tax moneys for religious 
purposes!' Id. at 504 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
206. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
207. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
208. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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rather than on some mythical injury-in-fact attributable to an individual 
taxpayer.'09 In  support of that notion, Brennan argued that Flast was a 
special case, applicable only to taxpayer claims involving the first amend- 
ment religion clauses and not to standing generally.210 Justice Brennan 
then argued that establishment clause cases themselves are special cases 
for taxpayer standing  purpose^.'^' 
It may be that Congress can tax for almost any reason, or for no 
reason at all. There is, so far as I have been able to discern, but one 
constitutionally imposed limit on that authority. Congress cannot use 
tax money to support a church, or to encourage religion. That is "the 
forbidden exaction." . . . In absolute terms the history of the Establish- 
ment Clause of the First Amendment makes this clear. History also 
makes it clear that the federal taxpayer is a singularly "proper and appro- 
priate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction" to challenge a federal 
bestowal of largesse as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Each, 
and indeed every, federal taxpayer suffers precisely the injury that the 
Establishment Clause guards against when the Federal Government di- 
rects that funds be taken from the pocketbooks of the citizenry and 
209. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Harlan's entire dissent was based upon 
that unstated premise: 
[The] taxpayer's complaint can consist only of an allegation that public funds have been, or 
shortly will be, expended for purposes inconsistent with the Constitution. The taxpayer 
cannot ask the return of any portion of his previous tax payments, cannot prevent the 
collection of any existing tax debt, and cannot demand an adjudication of the propriety of 
any particular level of taxation. His tax payments are received for the general purposes of 
the United States, and are, upon proper receipt, lost in the general revenues. 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Earlier in the opinion, Justice 
Harlan had discussed this problem in more explicit terms: 
[Tlaxpayers' interests in the expenditure of public funds [are not] differentiated from those 
of the general public by any special rights retained by them in their tax payments. The 
simple fact is that no such rights can sensibly be said to exist. . . . The national legislature 
is required by the Constitution to exercise its spending powers to "provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare." Art. I, 5 8, cl. 1. Whatever other implications there mny 
be to that sweeping phrase, it surely means that the United States holds its general funds, 
not as stakeholder or trustee for those who have paid its imposts, but as surrogate for the 
population at large. Any rights of a taxpayer with respect to the purposes for which those 
funds are expended are thus subsumed in, and extinguished by, the common rights of all 
citizens. To characterize taxpayers' interests in such expenditures as proprietary or even 
personal either deprives those terms of ail meaning or postulates for taxpayers a scintilla 
juris in funds that are no longer theirs. . . . We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian 
plaintiffs complain, just as the petitioner in Frothingham sought to complain, not as tax- 
payers, but as "private attorneys-general." The interests they represent, and the rights they 
espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indis- 
tinguishable from any group selected at random from among the general population, tax- 
payers and nontaxpayers alike. 
Id. at 118-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
This Article does not disagree with Justice Harlan's characterization, but argues instead that in 
certain circumstances it is appropriate to adopt a broader concept of standing, consistent with the 
existence of such collectively shared interests, as the only effective available means to correct govern- 
mental wrongs. See infra Part 111. 
210. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 507-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
211. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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placed into the coffers of the ministry.212 
Thus, Justice Brennan realized that some claims of government misbe- 
havior are not amenable to adjudication under traditional standing doc- 
trine. But instead of insisting in procrustean fashion, as the majority did, 
that cases should be made to fit the standing doctrine, Justice Brennan 
implicitly suggested that the doctrine should be modified to fit the cases 
so that the judiciary could redress government wrongs. By the time Val- 
ley Forge was decided, however, a decade of Supreme Court standing 
decisions had made it clear that access to the federal courts in constitu- 
tional cases was far more limited.213 Yet the trend toward narrower 
standing was not without its interruptions, as the next Section 
demonstrates. 
B. Grants of Standing 
The Court began the 1970's by distinguishing questions of standing 
from questions involving the merits. In Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations, Inc. v. CampY2l4 the Court considered a private 
corporation's challenge to a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency 
that permitted banks to make nonbanking data-processing services avail- 
able to other banks and bank customers. The plaintiff alleged that the 
ruling violated the Bank Service Corporation Act215 and permitted banks 
212. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 45 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)). At the same 
time, Justice Brennan noted the practical impossibility of a taxpayer challenge at the time of collec- 
tion of the funds, rather than when they are disbursed. This, he argued, militates in favor of a 
subsequent establishment clause challenge even though a successful challenge may not directly bene- 
fit the taxpayer-plaintias pocketbook. Id. at 509-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
213. Standing is not the only device that the Supreme Court used to narrow the availability of a 
federal forum for consideration of constitutional challenges during the 1970's. In a series of cases 
beginning in 1971, the Court announced the reemergence of a federal abstention doctrine based on 
considerations of comity, equity, and federalism. Under the doctrine, federal courts could not con- 
sider constitutional questions arising in state criminal proceedings, except at the Supreme Court level 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 1257 (1982), when such questions could be decided by the state tribunals 
themselves. The doctrine's purpose was to avoid undue interference with state criminal justice sys- 
tems. Younger v. Hams, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). As the decade progressed, this bar to federal action 
expanded to cases where the state proceeding was only quasi-criminal, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
420 U.S. 592 (1975), to some cases where the federal proceeding commenced before the state crimi- 
nal proceeding, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), to cases where there was no state crimi- 
nal proceeding pending at all, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and finally to cases where the 
state proceeding was clearly civil, see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 
U.S. 434 (1977). The Younger doctrine and the Supreme Court's reluctance to permit the federal 
courts to enforce federal constitutional guarantees have been sharply criticized. See, e.g., Zeigler, A 
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative Histoty of Reconstruction, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 987. In all of the Younger line of cases, the plaintiffs clearly had standing, but the Court 
employed other justiciability doctrines in order to deny them access to the federal courts. 
214. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
215. Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. 5 1864 (1962) (significantly amended 1982): "No 
bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for 
banks." 
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to compete unlawfully with nonbanking organizations. The district 
court dismissed the action for lack of standing and the court of appeals 
a f f i ~ m e d . " ~  
The Supreme Court used Camp to clarify the injury-in-fact require- 
ment. The Court easily found that the plaintiff had demonstrated injury- 
in-fact. The anticipated loss of future business to competing banks, plus 
the plaintiffs allegations that present customers had been lured away by 
a particular bank, constituted sufficient injury. In so holding, the Court 
rejected the court of appeals' requirement of injury to some legally recog- 
nized interest of the individual-an interest conferred by statute or con- 
tract--or to some public interest where the plaintiffs standing was 
congressionally re~ognized.'~' "The 'legal interest' test goes to the mer- 
its. The question of standing is The plaintiff need only 
show that he was in the "zone of interests" protected by the statute. The 
unanimous Court went on to emphasize that the interest need not be 
economic, but that it might reflect " 'aesthetic, conservational, and recre- 
ational' as well as economic  value^."''^ The Court thus took an expan- 
sive view of the injury-in-fact test and did not require that the plaintiff 
allege a violation of a law designed for his protection, as required by the 
nexus test. In these respects, the Camp Court was far more liberal than 
- 
216. Association of Data Processing Sew. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 
1968), offd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
217. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. Thus, under the legally-protected-interest test, the plaintiff would 
have had to show that the Bank Service Corporation Act's restriction, see supra note 215, was in- 
tended to protect its members from increased competition or that they had some common law or 
constitutional right to be free from such competition. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Tertn, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 177-81 (1970). The absence of such a right would have deprived the plaintiff of 
standing. Under the test adopted in Camp, it was sufficient that the plaintiff was injured by defend- 
ant's failure to require banks to operate within the restrictions of the Act, since such operation 
would have, as a practical matter, relieved the plaintiff of the burden of competition from banks. 
218. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. In Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), decided with Camp, the 
Court reiterated the disutility of the legal interest test. Barlow was brought by tenant farmers chal- 
lenging an amendment to a Department of Agriculture regulation that dealt with assignments of 
funds received pursuant to the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. Ej 590h(g) 
(1982). The lower courts ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing because no legally protected inter- 
est had been invaded. Barlow, 397 U.S. at 163-64. The Court rejected this narrow view of standing, 
and held that the plaintiffs were "within the zone of interests protected by the Act," id. at 164, 
because there clearly had been congressional intent to benefit tenant farmers. Id. at 164-65. The 
Court did not, however, elaborate on the extent to which the "zone of interests" concept was broader 
than the "legally protected interests" concept. 
219. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154 (quoting Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. 
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal 
Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965)). Interestingly, the Court noted in dictum that 
"[a] person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give 
standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause arid the Free Exercise Clause." Id. 
(citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)). The assertion is clearly at odds 
with the Court's subsequent disposition of Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Seesupra notes 193-212 and accompanying 
text. 
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the Courts that later decided Valley Forge, Schlesinger, and 
Ri~hardson.~~' 
Justice Brennan concurred in the results of Camp and the compan- 
ion case of Barlow v. Collins,221 but disagreed with the Court's standing 
analysis. He noted that the Court used a two-step inquiry in Camp, ask- 
ing first whether plaintiff had suffered injury-in-fact and second whether 
the interest asserted was within the zone of protected interests.222 But, 
he argued, the second step was inappropriate to standing analysis since it 
looked to the merits of the controversy or to its general just i~iabi l i ty .~~~ 
I had thought we discarded the notion of any additional requirement 
when we discussed standing solely in terms of its constitutional content 
in Flast v. Cohen . . . . By requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, 
the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement 
that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the chal- 
lenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected 
interests.224 
Justice Brennan's reading of Flast finds some support in his quotation of 
that case. The Flast majority had declared that " 'when standing is 
placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose stand- 
ing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particu- 
lar issue' and not [according to Justice Brennan] . . . whether on the 
merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the defendant's 
action invaded."225 FIast was not as clear, however, as Justice Brennan's 
assertion made it seem. The Court's exclusion of the legally-protected- 
interest test in Flast was implicit rather than explicit. 
Nonetheless, Camp initiated two liberal trends in the standing area: 
repudiation of the legally-protected-interest test in favor of the zone-of- 
interest analysis, and Justice Brennan's strong assertion that the only ap- 
propriate inquiry was directed to injury-in-fact. Professor Davis regards 
Camp as a watershed opinion. 
In Data Processing. . . the Supreme Court unanimously superceded 
a large batch of law [holding] . . . that something in the nature of a 
"legal right" or 'legal interest" was necessary for standing. That shift is 
a great accomplishment and it deserves strong emphasis, for federal law 
of standing now has a new and better orientation. But that much is no 
220. See supra notes 120-49, 193-212 and accompanying text. 
221. 397 U.S. 159 (1970); see supra note 218. 
222. Barlow, 397 U.S. at 167-68 (Brennan, J., concumng and dissenting). 
223. Id. at 168-69 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
224. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted) (distinguishing Asso- 
ciated Indus. v. Ickes. 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943) (relying upon the legally protected interest 
test)). 
225. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., concumng and dissenting) (quoting mast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
99-100 (1968)). 
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longer a live issue, for it has been fully resolved by a unanimous 
The Court seemed to reaffirm its liberal movement two years later in 
Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,227 in which residents of a 
housing complex charged that the landlord had violated the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968228 by discriminating against nonwhite applicants. The lower 
courts dismissed the complaint on the ground that only victims of dis- 
crimination had standing.229 A unanimous Court reversed, finding that 
the statute defined an aggrieved person as one "who claims to have been 
injured by a discriminatory housing practice."230 The Trajjcicante plain- 
tiffs claimed to have suffered loss of social and business opportunities and 
imposition of a stigma by being residents of a "white ghetto."231 The 
Court found that these claims constituted injury-in-fact and that they 
were sufficiently pleaded to establish the individualized absent 
in Sierra Club v. Morton.233 The Court also noted that Congress had 
broadened the concept of "persons aggrieved," making them private at- 
tomeys general-a classification the Court regarded as "not uncommon 
in modem legislative programs."234 Finally, the Court noted how broad 
a concept of standing it was willing to consider, at least in civil rights 
cases: "The person on the landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of 
discriminatory housing practices; it is, as Senator Javits said in support- 
ing the bill, 'the whole community.' "235 
In Traficante, the Court implicitly propounded several notions 
about standing. First, it reaffirmed the Camp view that injury-in-fact 
might be noneconomic.236 Second, its reversal of the lower courts' dis- 
226. Davis, supra note 21, at 457 (footnote omitted). Professor Davis' view that Camp settled 
the issue, however, now appears to have been overly optimistic, at least in the fourth amendment 
area, where the Court has sub silenrio returned to the old standard. See supra notes 179-92 and 
accompanying text. 
227. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
228. 42 U.S.C. $5 3601-3619 (1982). 
229. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352,353 (N.D. Cal.), afd ,  446 F.2d 
1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 205,208 (1972). The lower courts viewed the plaintifs as 
asserting third-party rights, perhaps anticipating the Court's position in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490 (1975). See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 514. 
230. 42 U.S.C. $ 3610(a) (1982). 
231. Traficante, 409 U.S. at 208. 
232. Id. at 209. 
233. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
234. Traficanfe, 409 U.S. at 21 1 (citing Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379,396 (1971); Allen v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,402 
(1968); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). The applicability of the private-attorney- 
general concept to the problems of standing is discussed infra in notes 367-73 and accompanying 
text. 
235. Traficante, 409 U.S. at 21 1 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2706 (1968)). The Court stated, 
"We can give vitality to [the Act] only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all 
in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facili- 
ties within the coverage of the statute." Id. at 212. 
236. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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missal implied that an individual might be injured for standing purposes 
by unlawful conduct directed at someone else. Third, and most impor- 
tant, it explicitly recognized that a legislative enactment might consider 
the whole community to be the benefited class, and that in such circum- 
stances, members of the benefited community ought to have standing to 
challenge a violation of the enactment.237 
The Court expanded its consideration of standing related to alleged 
noneconomic injury in United States v. SCRAP,238 in which an environ- 
mental group challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling 
permitting railroads to levy a surcharge for transportation of recyclable 
cornrn~dities.'~~ The plaintiff organization alleged that the ruling dis- 
couraged use of recyclable goods, and thus had an adverse impact on the 
environment. Unlike the plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Morton,240 the 
SCRAP plaintiff had pleaded a threat to its members' own enjoyment of 
the en~ironment.'~' At the same time, the Court recognized that the 
injury alleged in SCRAP was not nearly so limited in scope as that in- 
volved in Sierra Club. 
But we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied sim- 
ply because many people suffer the same injury. . . . To deny standing 
to persons who are in fact injured, simply because many others are also 
injured would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government 
actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that 
conclusion.242 
Thus, the Court specifically acknowledged that the existence of wide- 
spread public noneconomic injury might suggest the absence of standing 
under the rubric of "generalized grievances" mentioned in United States 
v. R i ~ h a r d s o n . ~ ~ ~  At the same time, the Court deliberately affirmed the 
necessity of finding standing in such cases. 
In Craig v.  borer^,^^^ the Court went a step further in a case involv- 
237. The Court reaffirmed the Traficante decision in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell- 
wood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), again giving an extremely broad reading to the word "aggrieved" in Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. $9 3601-3619 (1982). In that case, the Court found 
that members of the community, not themselves discriminated against, nevertheless had standing to 
challenge Gladstone's actions, 441 U.S. at 11 1-15, and further noted that "[als we have said before, 
'[tlhere can be no question about the importance' to a community of 'promoting stable, racially 
integrated housing.' " Id. at 11 1 (quoting Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977)). 
The importance of this observation to the concept of collective rights will be discussed infra in Part 
111. 
238. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
239. Id. at 672-78. 
240. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
241. "Here, by contrast [with Sierra Club], the appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly 
illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources of 
the Washington Metropolitan Area." SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687. 
242. Id. at 687-88. 
243. 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974); see supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
244. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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ing widespread injury to constitutional rights: it allowed a third party to 
assert them. The plaintiffs challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohib- 
ited the sale of 3.2% beer to males but not to females in the same age 
group, charging that it constituted gender-based discrimination. The 
case was brought by a male in the restricted age group and by a licensed 
vendor of beer, but the Supreme Court heard the appeal only from the 
vendor.245 The Court upheld the vendor's standing to sue, noting that 
she clearly satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.246 The majority rec- 
ognized, however, that on the merits, the vendor was relying upon an 
equal protection claim based on unequal treatment of other people. With 
respect to the nexus problem, the Court stated: 
[Olur decisions have settled that limitations on a litigant's assertion ofjus 
tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary 
"rule of self-restraint" designed to minimize unwarranted intervention 
into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are ill- 
defined and speculative. . . . These prudential objectives, [generally] 
thought to be enhanced by restrictions on third-party standing, cannot be 
furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the rele- 
vant constitutional challenge and the parties have sought--or at least 
have never resisted-an authoritative constitutional determination. In 
such circumstances, a decision by us to forgo consideration of the consti- 
tutional merits in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the 
statute by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repeti- 
tive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and pru- 
dence. Moreover, insofar as the applicable constitutional questions have 
been and continue to be presented vigorously and "cogently," . . . the 
denial ofjus tertii standing in deference to a direct class suit can serve no 
functional purpose.247 
Craig thus demonstrates the Court's recognition that there may be cir- 
cumstances where third-party representation of constitutional rights is 
appropriate, and reaffirms that problems with third-party standing are 
not constitutionally based.248 
245. Craig, the young male plaintiff, had exceeded the upper age limit of the affected group 
following the Court's determination of probable jurisdiction of the appeal, mooting the case as to 
him. Id. at 192 & n.2. 
246. Id. at 194. In fact, the defendants conceded her standing. Id. at 193. 
247. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted). 
248. Craig was not a unanimous decision; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. 
Only the Chief Justice's opinion mentioned the question of the vendor's standing. Justice Rehnquist, 
who wrote exclusively on the merits, apparently acquiesced in the majority's treatment of the stand- 
ing issue. 
In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), a strong majority of the Court relied on 
Craig and allowed vendors of contraceptive devices, on behalf of themselves and potential purchas- 
ers, to challenge a New York statute limiting access to and advertisement of contraceptives. Seven 
members of the Court explicitly joined the portion of the Court's opinion allowing standing. Justice 
Rehnquist, as in Craig, dissented on the merits without mentioning standing. The Chief Justice 
dissented without explanation. 
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In 1978, the Court clarified some of the limitations of the two-part 
standing test. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, I~c . ,~~ '  environmental groups and individuals challenged the 
Price-Anderson liability limitation for private developers of nu- 
clear power plants. The defendants, the Duke Power Company and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, argued that the plaintiffs failed to sat- 
isfy either prong of the standing test. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Court found the plaintiffs' injury-in-fact in the "environmental and 
aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution of the two lakes in the 
vicinity of the disputed power plants."251 Certainly, the Court said, this 
is "the type of harmful effect which has been deemed adequate in prior 
cases to satisfy the 'injury in fact' ~tandard."'~' Apart from the plain- 
tiffs' fear of nuclear accidents, therefore, the Court found their allega- 
tions of injury sufficiently nonspeculative to justify standing. 
The Court flatly repudiated the nexus test's applicability to cases 
other than taxpayer suits. "We . . . cannot accept the contention that, 
outside the context of taxpayers' suits, a litigant must demonstrate some- 
thing more than injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judi- 
cial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury to satisfy 
the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III."253 The Court went on 
to state explicitly that the other limitations on standing were prudential 
only, referring specifically to its concerns about the proper role of the 
courts in American its rejection of the courts as a forum for 
airing generalized grievances,255 and its limited approach to third-party 
standing.256 The Court noted: "Where a party champions his own 
rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one 
which will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic 
practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are 
generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met."257 Thus, 
the Court seemed almost to merge its prudential concerns into the consti- 
tutionally based injury-in-fact requirement, at least for some purposes. 
To the extent that this occurred, it clearly indicated a liberalization of the 
249. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
250. 42 U.S.C. 5 2210 (1982). 
251. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 73. 
252. Id. at 73-74 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727 (1972)). 
253. Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). 
254. Id. at 80 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)). 
255. Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)). 
256. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 
(1960)). 
257. Id. at 80-81 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977)). 
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Court's view on standing.258 
The Court's approach to standing throughout the past fifteen years 
has clearly been inconsistent.259 The apparently liberal trend of the 
Court in Camp, SCRAP, Craig, Carey, and Duke Power led to expan- 
sions in the concept of injury-in-fact and the availability of third-party 
standing, as well as a corresponding limitation of the prudentially based 
nexus test as a restrictive factor in standing. At the same time, in Sierra 
Club, the Court took an extremely restrictive approach to the require- 
ments for proper1.y pleading injury-in-fact. Moreover, the Court clearly 
refused to recognize that any taxpayer or citizen (or, one supposes, all of 
them260) might have a sufficient particularized interest in lawful govern- 
ment conduct to give rise to injury-in-fact when government acts unlaw- 
And in Warth v. SeIdin,262 the Court took an extremely 
restrictive view of both injury-in-fact and third-party standing, refusing 
to reach the substantive while insisting on a degree of pleading 
exactitude and third-party interest not seen prior to that time and cer- 
tainly inconsistent with its decision a year later in Craig. Finally, in Val- 
ley Forge, the Court made clear its hostility to citizen claims of unlawful 
government conduct unless such claimants were able to show some in- 
jury more concrete than damage to their interest in having government 
abide by the social compact.264 
C. Problems with the Current Standing Model 
Wholly apart from the inconsistencies in the Court's positions on 
standing, the majority's increasingly restrictive view of standing poses 
258. The Duke Power Court's view of standing was not unanimous. Justice Stewart, concurring 
in the result, questioned whether the plaintiffs had shown sufficient injury-in-fact to cross the consti- 
tutional threshold. Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
259. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 27, and the authorities cited at 68 n.3. 
260. See infra Part 11, Section C. 
261. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see also supra notes 120-49 and accompanying text. 
262. 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text. 
263. Indeed, Justices Douglas and Brennan attributed the Court's decision to something less 
than dispassionate judicial reasoning. "With all respect, I think that the Court reads the complaint 
and the record with antagonistic eyes." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
[ l h e  opinion, which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who 
could be injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an 
indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits. I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to 
adjudicate the complex and difficult legal questions involved . . . . But courts cannot re- 
fuse to hear a case on the merits merely because they would prefer not to, and it is quite 
clear, when the record is viewed with dispassion, that at least three of the groups of plain- 
tiffs have made allegations, and supported them with affidavits and documentary evidence, 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 
Id. at 520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
264. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
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substantial problems for a nation that, on the Lockean model, proceeds 
on the basis that government results from a social compact and is the 
trustee of the powers settled upon it by the citizens whose consent gives it 
legitimacy. Many of the problems can be illustrated by extensions of 
some of the Court's recent standing cases themselves. For example, sup- 
pose that Congress passed a joint resolution declaring that the legislative 
branch could not properly consider the military budget unless each of its 
members became a general or admiral in the armed forces. Suppose fur- 
ther that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, acceded to the request 
and commissioned each member. The nation would then be faced with a 
wholesale, deliberate violation, by Congress and the President, of the in- 
compatability Yet under the rationale of Schlesinger v. Reserv- 
ists Committee to Stop the War,266 no judicial remedy would exist 
because no one would have standing. Indeed, this hypothetical merely 
confirms the recognition by the Schlesinger Court that the judicial system 
provides no remedy for certain types of governmental conduct that vio- 
late the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
Cases like Valley Forge 268 present similar problems. Assuming that 
the conveyance to Valley Forge Christian College constituted a prohib- 
ited establishment of religion, one may legitimately ask who would have 
had standing to challenge it. Taxpayer standing was ruled out as a ba- 
sis,269 as was citizen standing,270 and the Court explicitly recognized that 
this created a situation where no conceivable plaintiff could have stand- 
ing.271 Taken to its logical extreme, the reasoning of Valley Forge can, 
like Schlesinger, lead to utterly absurd results. Suppose Congress con- 
veyed Fort Hood, Texas, to a fundamentalist religious group so that it 
could establish a center of religious worship. Clearly such a transfer 
would violate the establishment clause;272 yet under the rationale of Val- 
ley Forge, no one would have standing to seek judicial redress. 
In fact, many establishment clause cases raise standing problems 
under the Valley Forge rationale, problems ordinarily ignored by the 
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 6, cl. 2. 
266. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text. 
267. Schlesitlger, 418 U.S. at 227. 
268. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra text accompanying note 203. 
272. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1973) (invalidating state funding for maintenance and repair of sectarian 
schools, tuition grants for private school attendance, and tuition tax credits); Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971) (upholding federal construction grants to private postsecondary educa- 
tional institutions only to the extent the funds were used for nonsectarian facilities); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (invalidating state salary supplement for teachers in private 
schools). 
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courts deciding such cases. For example, in Zorach v. C l a ~ s o n , ~ ~ ~  the 
plaintiffs challenged a New York program involving released time for 
public school students to attend religious instruction. The instruction 
program was not on school premises and received no state financial sup- 
port, direct or indirect.274 The Supreme Court upheld the program with- 
out any mention of standing. Yet, viewed in terms of Valley Forge, it is 
difficult to pinpoint any injury-in-fact to the plaintiffs, whose children 
remained in the secular schools for instruction during the released time 
period, other than some injury to their "spiritual stake" in the abstract 
concept of separation of church and state.275 Similarly, in Board of Edu- 
cation v. a case challenging a New York program to lend text- 
books to religious schools for instruction in secular subjects, the Court 
also proceeded to the merits without any mention of standing.277 
Possible cases of government lawlessness in which no one would 
have standing are not limited either to establishment clause cases or to 
situations like those in Richardson or Schlesinger. Indeed, the Court's 
insistence that "generalized grievances" cannot be the basis for stand- 
ing278 raises the spectre of all sorts of abuses by government where no 
one would have standing to seek judicial inter~ention. '~~ Clearly, the 
prospect of a standing doctrine so restrictive as to prohibit the courts 
from restraining even the grossest types of governmental misconduct is 
not an enticing one. Yet the Court has warned that recognition of a 
substantially broader standing doctrine, or one based on an altered con- 
cept of injury-in-fact, would eviscerate the constitutional requirements 
relating to standing.280 But the Court's response to the article I11 prob- 
273. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
274. In this respect, the program differed from the program the Court invalidated in Illinois ex 
re!. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
275. This interest was noted by the Court in dictum in Association of Data Processing Scrv. 
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). See supra note 219 and accon~panying text. 
276. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
277. This is not to suggest that the plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate injury-in-fact in any 
establishment clause case. For example, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the plaintiff 
challenged Sunday closing laws. Traditional injury-in-fact was easily demonstrated; enforcement of 
the laws resulted in plaintiffs loss of revenue from either closing on Sundays or paying fines for being 
open. Id. at 430-31;see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120-27 (1982) (plaintiff had 
standing to challenge Massachusetts law permitting churches to veto issuance of liquor licenses to 
establishments within 500 feet). 
278. See supra notes 120-41, 201-03 and accompanying text. 
279. For example, in the early 1970's, it was rumored that then Vice President Spiro Agnew had 
discussed suspending the 1972 general elections. See J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION 32-33 (1976). Sup- 
pose that the Nixon administration had done so, using national security as a pretext to attempt to 
remain in office. Taking the Court's analysis to its logical extreme, no one would have standing to 
challenge the suspension except, perhaps, persons who could make a sufficiently concrete showing 
that they would have been candidates in those elections. Everyone else's interest would have been 
indistinguishable in character from the plaintiffs' interest in Valley Forge or Scltlesit~ger. 
280. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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lem does not follow ineluctably from this premise. In the next Part, this 
Article proposes a new approach to "stake in the outcome" which leads 
to a broader, yet still manageable, standing doctrine consistent with our 
philosophical history. 
I11 
COLLECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING 
The Court's approach to standing has been inconsistent in two im- 
portant ways. First, the Justices have not settled on a single concept of 
injury-in-fact, with reference to how individualized or generalized it must 
be.281 Second, they have inconsistently applied the nexus test, relying 
heavily upon it in fourth amendment cases282 while refusing even to ac- 
knowledge it as part of standing doctrine in other than taxpayer 
This Part of the Article explores a new approach to standing that elimi- 
nates the inconsistencies in current standing doctrine and permits suits 
involving serious governmental trespasses that currently appear immune 
from judicial remedy.284 
This Part first sets out an additional kind of interest in constitutional 
cases, supplying a new predicate for the constitutionally required "stake 
in the outcome":285 collective rights. Second, the compatibility of a col- 
lective stake in the outcome with our Lockean constitutional heritage is 
demonstrated. Third, areas where collective rights have already been or 
ought to be recognized are noted and discussed. Finally, this Part pro- 
poses a new theory of standing in constitutional cases that is consistent 
with the foregoing analysis yet does not create universal standing. 
A. The Interest To Be Protected and the Lockean Model 
The classic statement of the case-or-controversy requirement in the 
area of standing is that plaintiffs must have "alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete ad- 
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The difficulty, of course, has occurred in applying the concept 
of "a personal stake in the outcome" to particular fact patterns. The 
281. Compare Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972) with 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974). See also supra notes 128, 227-37 and 
accompanying text. 
282. See supra notes 179-92 and accompanying text. 
283. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978); see 
also supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra pp. 92-94. 
285. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
286. Id. 
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Court insists that if an individual's interest in a controversy is undifferen- 
tiated from the rest of the citizenry's, he has not demonstrated a suffi- 
cient personal stake in the outcome.287 But this doctrinal approach leads 
to an anomaly: if government broadly and nonspecifically violates the 
Constitution, no individual has a sufficient stake in the outcome to pur- 
sue a judicial remedy. In short, the Court tells us that, for purposes of 
standing, no one has a sufficient stake to keep government behavior 
within constitutional limits. 
In a Lockean society, this is the ultimate contradiction. The citi- 
zenry's compact and consent create the government and give it legiti- 
macy. Citizens' inability to challenge actions that violate the charter of 
government's existence make the charter unenfor~eable.~~~ It becomes 
the constitutional analog of the unenforceable contract that declares, "I 
will if I want to."289 In fact, however, the Lockean model provides a 
solution to the dilemma. Because the society creates the government, 
and because the government is responsible to its creator-not as one con- 
tracting party to another but rather as trustee to settlorZg0 or agent to 
principal2g1-there is a clear collective societal interest in having the gov- 
ernment behave in strict accord with the Constitution. When govern- 
ment violates the Constitution, the stake in the outcome of the 
controversy is society's stake, and is the most fundamental interest possi- 
ble: the interest in government functioning as agreed upon by its 
creators. 
The collective interest concept is certainly not new, as Part I demon- 
strates. Locke conceived of the civil state as one in which government is 
responsible to society as a whole, rather than to any particular individ- 
ual.292 That concept was echoed in the Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n ~ e ~ ~ ~  
and subsequent American Both legal relationships suggested 
287. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); supra notes 120-58, 193-213 and accompa- 
nying text. 
288. The only possible enforcement mechanism is the electoral process, but that is ill-suited to 
resolution of constitutional questions. See infra notes 312-21 and accompanying text. 
Professor Nichol has noted that the Court's approach to standing in cases like Valley Forgc 
means that the Constitution cannot always be enforced. "The Court . . . views some constitutional 
provisions as enforceable and others not." Nichol, supra note 27, at 92. 
289. In the law of contracts this is referred to as an illusory promise. "Such on illusory promise 
is neither enforceable against the one making it, nor is it operative as a condition for a return prom- 
ise." Corbin, The Eflect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571, 574 (1925) (footnote 
omitted). 
290. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra note 70. 
292. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
293. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
294. For example, James Madison specifically spoke of "the permanent and aggregate interests 
of the community," THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), in arguing 
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by the Lockean model of civil society connote collective rights. First, the 
people whose consent gives rise to government may be regarded as a 
principal, and government as the agent.295 The agency is created by the 
people acting as a collective unit, not by any individual; hence the re- 
sponsibility of the governmental agent is to the collective principal. Sec- 
ond, Locke spoke of government as a trustee of powers given to it by the 
people,296 and the people thus become both the settlors and the benefi- 
ciaries of the governmental 
Two analogies from the law of frusts demonstrate these relation- 
ships. The beneficiaries of a trust have standing to challenge the malfea- 
sance of the trustee, though the beneficiary must show that the trustee's 
conduct has harmed the beneficiary's interest under the trust.298 The law 
of standing in the trust area, therefore, appears to parallel the Supreme 
Court's injury-in-fact analysis in constitutional adjudication. The 
Supreme Court has failed to recognize, however, that under the Ameri- 
can constitutional model, the beneficiary's interest is the performance of 
the governmental trustee, not the receipt of more tangible benefits. The 
settlor of a trust for public benefit also has standing to challenge the mis- 
behavior of his trustee if the settlor retains a beneficial interest in the 
performance of the trust.299 In this respect, Locke's trust metaphor sug- 
gests a different concept of standing in constitutional cases, one that rec- 
ognizes the citizenry as the source of the fiduciary power lodged in 
government. When a trustee violates the terms of the trust, the settlors 
and beneficiaries have standing to enforce the terms of the trust through 
the courts. Why should not the same be true when the governmental 
trustee violates the terms of the trust expressed in the Constitution? 
Of course, one of the terms of this governmental trust is that judicial 
challenges may be raised only within the limits of the trust agreement- 
the Constitution. However, the Constitution requires only that a case or 
controversy exist for the judicial power of the United States to be exer- 
cised. It is the Supreme Court that has interpreted the case-or-contro- 
versy clause as requiring the individual plaintiff to have a stake in the 
outcome,300 insisted that such a stake can be demonstrated only by plain- 
tiffs injury-in-fa~t,~OI and declared that the government's violation of the 
for a republican form of government that could "break and control the violence of faction." Id. at 
77. Two years later he commented on "the general principle, that laws are unconstitutional, which 
infringe the rights of the community." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 458 (J. Gales ed. 1789). 
295. See supra note 70. 
296. See supra notes 48-50, 57-61 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
298. A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS $5 199.1-.3 (3d ed. 1967). 
299. Id. $ 200.1. 
300. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
301. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
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Constitution, without more, can never give rise to the sort of injury that 
satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement.302 The Court's belittling 
references to "generalized grievances" imply that government's obedi- 
ence to the Constitution is too meager an interest to deserve judicial 
attention. In fact, in a society based on the Lockean model, there can 
hardly be a greater interest, or one more worthy of judicial attention. 
The question whether the government has complied with the Constitu- 
tion goes to the civil society's continuing right to exist as an organized 
unit.303 
One must remember that society, acting as a unit, creates the gov- 
ernment. No individual, standing alone, may properly be regarded as the 
settlor of the governmental trust. As Locke made clear in discussing 
society's formation and dissolution, it is the collective body of society 
that stands in direct relationship to government. For example, recall 
Locke's description of the two-step process that forms civil society: first, 
individuals combine into a society, and second, the community vests its 
power in government as a Similarly, the right retained by soci- 
ety to dissolve itself and to do away with civil government-the Lockean 
right of revolution-is also collective.305 Thus, the interest in govern- 
ment's proper performance is primarily collective306 because of the 
processes of government formation and dissolution. To the extent the 
judiciary regulates government on behalf of the people, the scope of adju- 
dication should be affected by the collective model of society upon which 
the nation is established. 
The Supreme Court has not been blind to this sort of collective in- 
terest. On occasion, the Court has specifically recognized it. In United 
States v. Richard~on,~~' the Court admitted that its developing standing 
doctrine might create circumstances in which no one would have stand- 
ing to sue. It did not, however, regard that as a problem with its doc- 
trine; rather, it viewed that situation as supporting its argument that such 
controversies should be remitted to the political process for resolution.308 
[Tlhat the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of 
course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the 
302. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,4?8-90 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208, 226-27 (1974). 
303. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
306. That is not to say, of course, that there is no individual interest in proper government 
functioning. Locke recognized such interests when he described government as existing to protect 
individuals' property rights, J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 5 138, at 378-79, and the American Bill of 
Rights was also designed in part to enhance individual interests. 
307. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
308. Id. at 179; see also supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. 
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"ground rules" established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of 
the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of 
Art. I11 jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the 
political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive 
though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our sys- 
tem provides for changing members of the political branches when dissat- 
isfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that 
elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to 
them.309 
Similarly, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, I ~ c . , ~ ~ O  the Court reiterated that "even 
when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Art. 111, the Court has refrained from adjudicating 'ab- 
stract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized 
grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches."311 Thus, the Court relied upon what it charac- 
terized as a "slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive" process for vindica- 
tion of rights sufficiently significant to merit specific constitutional 
mention. 
There are four shortcomings in the majority's reliance on the polit- 
ical process to correct constitutional violations. First, as the Court itself 
has recognized, the political process is notoriously slow. Moreover, it is 
particularly unresponsive to single-issue candidacies, especially at the na- 
tional The more diverse the electorate and the more compli- 
cated the issue facing it, the less any single issue is likely to be dispositive 
in the electoral 
Second, the Court in effect makes constitutional decisions a matter 
309. Richardson, 418 U.S. at  179. The Court did not explain why its treatment of standing in 
Richardson compels the conclusion that such disputes should be handled politically. 
310. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
31 1. 454 U.S. at  474-75 (emphasis added) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 
(1975)). 
312. See Jaffe, supra note 27, at  1286-87 ("Formal majorities register judgments only occasion- 
ally, and then as a rule not on specific issues but on total performance."). The phenomenon Profes- 
sor Jaffe refers to is merely a general reflection of American voting patterns. "The role that any 
specific issue may play in ultimate partisan choice is limited in several directions. Only rarely does a 
single policy belief comprise the sole force in the psychological field as the voting decision is made." 
A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 97-98 (abr. ed. 
1964). 
313. The Third Circuit has noted the difficulties of the political process in the context of broad- 
ening standing: "Mnless individuals avemng an encroachment of their legal rights have some re- 
course other than the political process for the vindication and protection of those rights, the proud 
claim that individual citizens have rights against the government may be emptied of significance." 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. & Wel- 
fare, 619 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
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of majority vote.314 The Court not only remits certain constitutional 
questions to the political process for resolution, but it also implicitly de- 
clares that the answers are not to be found in the Constitution itself. 
Rather, they are to be determined by the electoral process-a process 
against which the Constitution was to provide some insulation.315 For 
example, in Valley Forge, the majority would apparently have the consti- 
tutionality of the conveyance be an issue in the next national election, 
after which, by tallying the vote, one would know whether the convey- 
ance did or did not violate the establishment clause. To the extent that 
this is the Court's implicit suggestion, it prescribes a form of constitu- 
tional relativism that poses substantial difficulties; stare decisis may be 
less than immutable, but its mood swings certainly cannot compare with 
those of the American electorate. 
The third problem stems from the limitations of the electoral pro- 
cess. Many constitutional questions avoided by the Court on standing 
grounds cannot be resolved by the electorate, no matter how speedy, con- 
sistent, and rational its behavior. For example, in Exparte L e ~ i t t , ~ ' ~  the 
plaintiff argued that Justice Black's appointment to the Supreme Court 
violated the ineligibility clause.317 The political process provided no pos- 
sible remedy for the allegedly unlawful actions of the President and the 
Senate that had placed Justice Black on the Court. Federal judges are 
not subject to recall; they can be removed from office only by impeach- 
ment, and then only for conduct not amounting to "good 
Thus, the allegedly unconstitutional appointment was immune to elec- 
toral correction. Similarly, there is no apparent political remedy for the 
conveyance of federal land to Valley Forge Christian College. Even if 
the electorate were to unite to vote out of office those responsible for the 
conveyance, that would provide no mechanism by which to set the con- 
314. The Court has previously made a similar suggestion in the fourth amendment context by 
leaving to the states the question of whether to adopt the exclusionary rule. In Irvine v. California, 
347 U.S. 128 (1954), the Court declined to reverse the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 
(1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule had no applica- 
tion to the states, though they were bound by the fourth amendment through the 14th amendment. 
The plurality in Irvine explained that "to upset state convictions even before the states have had 
adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the rule would be an unwarranted use of federal power," 
347 U.S. at 134 (Jackson, J.). The Court did not explain why state courts' use of evidence seized in 
violation of the fourth amendment should become more or less constitutional according to how 
many states repudiated the practice, nor did it explain how, if the rule were not constitutionally 
required, the Supreme Court would have any basis for imposing it on the states. 
315. Indeed, James Madison noted at some length that the then-proposed Constitution was 
structured to prevent, to the extent possible, tyrannies of the majority. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (J. 
Madison); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (specif- 
ically recognizing that the first amendment was intended to limit such tyrannies). 
316. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam); see supra note 129. 
317. U.S. CONST. art. I, 96,  cl. 2. 
318. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 1. 
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veyance aside.319 It is, therefore, a bit too facile for the Court to assert, 
as it did in R i ~ h a r d s o n , ~ ~ ~  that questions that the federal courts refuse to 
address on standing grounds may be resolved through the political 
The fourth problem concerns the role of the federal courts in the 
constitutional system. Since Marbury v. Madison,322 the established prin- 
ciple has been that the responsibility for evaluating the constitutionality 
of congressional and executive actions is lodged in the judiciary.323 Even 
before the Constitution was adopted, James Madison recognized the judi- 
ciary's role in restraining government,324 and the Supreme Court itself 
has been unequivocal in its support of this quintessentially judicial func- 
tion. "[Ilt is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction 
of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the 
Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 
14th Amendment forbids the State to do.''325 The Burger Court has rec- 
ognized that under the Constitution, "the judiciary is clearly discernible 
as the primary means through which [constitutional] rights may be en- 
The Court's assertion, therefore, that the judiciary must yield 
to the political process when certain constitutional questions arise is in- 
319. Indeed, once title became vested in the college, an argument could be made that a subse- 
quent attempt to legislatively undo the conveyance would constitute a taking without just compensa- 
tion in violation of the fifth amendment. 
320. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
321. That is not to say that no problem presented in a standing case is addressable in the elec- 
toral forum. It certainly is true that, upon rejection of his plea in the courts for a declaration that 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act was unconstitutional, Richardson could have mounted a nation- 
wide campaign to elect a Congress and, if necessary, a President who would effect a repeal of the 
challenged statute. Some, of course, might view this as impractical. See supra notes 312-13 and 
accompanying text. 
322. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
323. See id.; accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (power to review intrabranch 
dispute between President and special prosecutor); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) 
(power to review congressional decision whether to seat a duly elected Member of Congress); 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (power to review exercise of congressional power to 
punish uncooperative witnesses). 
324. Justice Brennan tried unsuccessfully to bring this part of American history to the Court's 
attention: 
As James Madison noted, if a bill of rights were "incorporated into the Constitution, in- 
dependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians 
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in 
the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon 
rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights." 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 494 n.6 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 
1789)). 
325. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted) (jurisdiction over claim for dam- 
ages suffered from federal agents' violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights). 
326. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (implied cause of action for due process 
violation). 
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consistent with its own stated view of its role in the constitutional 
system.327 
Thus, although the Court recognizes the collective interest in re- 
straining government within the confines of the constitution, it generally 
characterizes that interest as insufficient to give rise to a case or contro- 
versy within the meaning of article III.328 Yet in several areas, the Court 
has recognized collective rights as part of the constitutional structure, 
and several Justices frequently speak of rights and remedies in collective 
terms. 
B. The Court's Recognition of Collective Rights 
Explicitly or implicitly, the Supreme Court329 has identified collec- 
tive rights in the first, second, fourth, sixth and thirteenth amend- 
m e n t ~ , ~ ~ ~  as well as in some of the provisions of article I.331 In the first 
amendment area, the collective interest has manifested itself in two ways. 
First, the Court has clearly demonstrated its recognition of collective in- 
terests in public and press access to judicial proceedings. For example, in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,332 the Court specifically noted "a 
guaranteed right of the public under the First and Fourteenth Amend- 
327. Chief Justice Marshall might have viewed the Court's current position more harshly, in 
light of his assertion in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), that for the Court to 
refuse to exercise power conferred on it by the Constitution is "treason to the Constitution." Id, at 
403. And, as Justice (later Chief Justice) Charles Evans Hughes said, "We are under a Constitution, 
but the Constitution is what the judges say it is . . . ." D. PERKINS, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP 16 (1956). 
328. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); supra notes 120-53 and accompanying text. 
329. One of the most vocal members of the Court in invoking community imagery is Chief 
Justice Burger, who argues that the community's collective interest must be given greater weight 
when balanced against the individual's than has heretofore been the case. But while he adopts the 
concept of community, the Chief Justice seems to apply it far more to limit assertion of individual 
constitutional rights than to aid in restricting unlawful governmental actions. See generally Chesler, 
Imagery of Community, Ideology of Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457 (1983). 
330. In addition, Justice Marshall made fleeting reference to a "social interest in preserving 
[fifth amendment] liberties and in the integrity of the criminal justice system" in Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 254 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting), but neither he nor the Court has 
pursued this idea. 
331. Both Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), characterized the plaintiffs' interests under the ineligibil- 
ity clause and the accounts clause as no more than generalized grievances, implicitly placing these 
constitutional provisions in the realm of collective, not individual, interests. A similar argument 
may be made with respect to Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam). 
332. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Richmond Newspapers involved a press challenge to a Virginia trial 
court order closing a defendant's fourth murder trial to the press at the request of defense counsel. 
The press' motion to vacate the closure order was denied. The Supreme Court had held a year 
earlier that there was no public sixth amendment right to attend preliminary court proceedings 
in criminal cases. Gannett Co. v. DePasquaie, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). By contrast, Riclltnond 
Newspapers presented the issue whether the first amendment allowed closure of criminal trials. The 
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ments to attend the Justice Brennan, concurring in the judg- 
ment, explored the nature of the public right at greater length and argued 
for more explicit recognition under the first amendment of such a public 
right to receive information.334 In these respects, Richmond Newspapers 
echoed dicta from earlier cases that suggested recognition of a public 
constitutional right.335 Thus, the Court has clearly recognized an inter- 
est held by the public under the first amendment to attend criminal 
trials.336 
Individual Justices have also argued on the basis of collective first 
amendment rights. For example, Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Douglas, dissented in Barenblatt v. United States,337 
a decision that affirmed a contempt of Congress conviction entered 
against a teacher who refused to answer questions of the House Un- 
American Activities Committee. Justice Black specifically referred to 
"the interest of the people in having [first amendment rights] exer- 
~ i s e d . " ~ ~ ~  Later in the same opinion, he sharply criticized the majority's 
approach: 
[The Court] balances the right of the Government to preserve itself, 
against Barenblatt's right to refrain from revealing Communist affilia- 
tions. Such a balance, however, mistakes the factors to be weighed . . . 
[and] completely leaves out the real interest in Barenblatt's silence, the 
interest of the people as a whole in being able to join organizations, advo- 
cate causes and make political "mistakes" without later being subjected 
to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves. . . . 
It is these interests of society, rather than Barenblatt's own right to si- 
Court declined to extend Gannett, but explicitly based its holding on the first, rather than the sixth 
amendment. 
One remarkable aspect of Richmond Newspapers is its unarticulated assumption of the peti- 
tioner's standing where the interest invoked was no less undifferentiated from that of the general 
citizenry than that in Valley Forge. See infra notes 388-92, 396-97 and accompanying text. 
333. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. Though the Chief Justice's opinion was only for a 
plurality of the Court, this aspect of it was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Blackmun and Stevens. Accord Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) 
("Richmond Newspapers firmly established . . . that the press and general public have a constitu- 
tional right of access to criminal trials. . . . [Sleven Justices recognized that this right of access is 
embodied in the First Amendment, and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment."); see also United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983) (access to pretrial criminal 
proceedings, specifically bail reduction hearing); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 
1982) (access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings). 
334. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also 
id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). 
335. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,541 (1965) ("[Tlhe public has the right to be informed as 
to what occurs in its courts . . . ."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public 
event. What transpires in the court room is public property."). 
336. The Third Circuit recently recognized that the public and press have a first amendment 
right of access to civil proceedings as well. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). 
337. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
338. Id. at 143 (Black. J.. dissenting). 
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lence, which I think the Court should put on the balance against the 
demands of the Government, if any balancing process is to be 
tolerated.339 
Thus, the three Justices recognized both the existence of a cognizable 
collective interest in the first amendment and the importance of consider- 
ing the possible antagonism between the collective, societal interest and 
the government's interest. The collective interest not only exists as a 
constitutional concept, but also requires protection from the government 
itself; the government cannot be assumed to represent it.340 
The Court's recognition of collective rights in the first amendment 
area has not been limited to questions of public access to courts. In 
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC341 and FCC v. Sanders Brothers 
Radio Station,342 which concerned disputes over FCC licenses to operate 
radio stations, the Court expressly recognized the status of radio stations 
as representatives of the public interest. In Scripps-Howard, the peti- 
tioner contested a modification of a competitor's license. In reviewing 
the petitioner's standing, the Court noted that the Communications Act 
of 1934343 was designed to protect "the public interest in communica- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The Act conferred a right of appeal on aggrieved persons, but 
the Court noted the limitations of that right. "[Tlhese private litigants 
have standing only as representatives of the public interest. . . . That a 
court is called upon to enforce public rights and not the interests of pri- 
vate property does not diminish its power to protect such rights."345 
Thus, the Court recognized that Congress had created a statutory collec- 
tive right in this area because of communication's public importance. 
Regarding the second amendment, courts have been even clearer 
about the nature of the right guaranteed. Case after case has considered 
whether the right to bear arms is an individual or a collective right. The 
Sixth Circuit, for example, stated unequivocally that "lilt is clear that the 
Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual 
right,"346 a view apparently reflected by every court to have considered 
339. Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting). 
340. See also Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972) (public interests in 
the first amendment may be more important than personal interests). 
341. 316 U.S. 4 (1942). 
342. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). 
343. 47 U.S.C. 98 i51-610 (1982). 
344. Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 14. 
345. Id. at 14-15 (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,477 (1940); National 
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940)). The Court's remarkable position that the petitioner 
had standing not as a private entity but only as a public representative stands in stark contrast to the 
Court's more common assertion that to represent the public interest a litigant must demonstrate a 
private right. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 114-16 and 
accompanying text. This apparently lenient position might be thought to result in part from the 
holding's statutory, rather than constitutional, basis. Bur see infra note 365. 
346. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cerr. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976). 
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the issue ~pecifically.~~' The courts have adopted this position because of 
the introductory phrase of the second amendment, referring to the right 
to bear arms in the context of maintenance of a militia.348 Nonetheless, 
it is significant that the courts have explicitly recognized that the Fram- 
ers of the Constitution intended to create at least one collective right. It 
is also noteworthy that this recognition came in consideration of an 
amendment that speaks of rights held by a plural entity, the people, 
rather than by an individual. Compare the rights of "the people" re- 
ferred to in the first, second, fourth, ninth, and tenth amendments with 
those of "the person" and "the accused" safeguarded in the fifth and 
sixth amendments. The second amendment joins the first as a provision 
in which collective rights have received a judicial imprimatur. 
In the fourth amendment area, the Supreme Court has been less 
forthright about recognizing collective interests, but it has nevertheless 
done so in cases considering application of the exclusionary rule. 
Through the 197OYs, the Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule ex- 
ists to protect the collective, societal interest in deterring fourth amend- 
ment violations, and not to make whole the victim of an unlawful search 
or seizure.349 Moreover, the Court used that societal interest concept as 
a predicate for refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in cases where the 
individual would have benefited by its application but the deterrent ef- 
fect-the benefit to society generally-would have been more tenuous.350 
The collective interest is, therefore, now clearly recognized in the fourth 
amendment area, though in the cases where the court has commented 
347. Eg., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 
261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on othergrounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 
521 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 
(1939). But see Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The Right To Bear Arms, 7 Hous. L. REV. 
1 (1969) (suggesting that the second amendment guarantee is individual as well as collective). 
348. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. 11. 
349. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974): 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search 
victim: "[Tlhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Rep- 
aration comes too late." Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police 
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreason- 
able searches and seizures . . . . In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 
Id. at 347-48 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)); accord United States v. Janis, 
428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
823 (1976). 
A contrary suggestion appears in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), which men- 
tions that one of the exclusionary rule's benefits is that it "restores the situation that would have 
prevailed if the Government had itself obeyed the law." Id. at 224 n.lO. Harrison has not been 
followed. 
350. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 349-52 (1974). 
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upon the societal interest, it has used that interest as a reason for refusing 
to punish unconstitutional government behavior. Despite that unusual 
twist, this development of fourth amendment jurisprudence is important 
because of the emergence of the collective interest analysis.351 
The collective, public interest in the fourth amendment was specifi- 
cally mentioned in Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. White.352 
[Tlhe issue here is whether to interpose a search warrant procedure be- 
tween law enforcement agencies engaging in electronic eavesdropping 
and the public generally. By casting its "risk analysis" solely in terms of 
the expectations and risks that "wrongdoers" or "one contemplating ille- 
gal activities" ought to bear, the plurality opinion, I think, misses the 
mark entirely. [By not requiring warrants to eavesdrop, the Court] does 
not simply mandate that criminals must daily run the risk of unknown 
eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs; it subjects each and every 
law-abiding member of society to that risk.353 
It was the public interest that Justice Harlan felt had been given insuffi- 
cient consideration by the White plurality. But because White was writ- 
ten in Justice Harlan's last year on the bench, it is impossible to tell 
whether his collective-interest interpretation w h l d  have swayed other 
members of the Court in the 1970's standing cases had he been there to 
urge it.354 
The Court has also implicitly recognized a public interest in the 
sixth amendment guarantee of a jury trial in all criminal cases.355 Some 
defendants, however, prefer to be tried to the court. The Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure permit a defendant to waive a jury and be tried to 
the court, provided the judge and prosecutor agree.356 In Singer v. 
United States,357 the Supreme Court upheld this restriction on the waiver 
of a jury trial. The Singer Court did not discuss why the waiver limita- 
351. For a detailed argument in favor of recognition of a collective fourth amendment right, see 
Doernberg, supra note 29. 
352. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Justice Harlan opposed reaffirmation of the Court's rule permitting 
warrantless electronic eavesdropping with the consent of any party to a conversation. That rule had 
been adopted by the Court in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). The Court had occasion 
in White to reconsider On Lee because the Seventh Circuit had reversed White's narcotics conviction 
on the ground that On Lee had been overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz 
had ruled that wiretapping or eavesdropping could constitute a fourth amendment violation despite 
the absence of physical trespass into an area in which the search victim had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. In White, the Court declined to extend Katz to the situation where one of the parties to a 
conversation has consented to the electronic intrusion. 
353. White, 401 U.S. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
354. See supra text accompanying notes 179-92. 
355. The Supreme Court now reads the word "all" in the sixth amendment to mean "somc," 
permitting a nonjury trial over the defendant's objection where the offense charged is "petty": i.e. 
carries a possible penalty of less than six months imprisonment. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
66, 69 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). 
356. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). 
357. 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
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tion had been instituted, but at least one reason may be inferred from the 
opinion. The Court noted that "[tlrial by jury has been established by 
the Constitution as the 'normal and . . . preferable mode of disposing of 
issues of fact in criminal cases.' "358 But to whom is this mode of adjudi- 
cation preferable? The preference is obviously not the defendant's, since 
Singer sought to waive the jury trial. The Singer Court's statement must 
reflect, therefore, the existence of an unarticulated public interest in the 
sixth amendment right to jury 
The thirteenth amendment360 also indirectly implicates collective 
rights. Titles VIII and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,361 which con- 
cern fair housing practices, were enacted as enforcement measures in or- 
der to eliminate one of the remaining badges of slavery in American 
In both Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood 363 and 
Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance C O . , ~ ~ ~  the Supreme Court ex- 
plicitly noted the community interest embodied in the Act and seized 
upon congressional recognition of that interest as a reason to find stand- 
ing for plaintiffs against whom there had been no discriminatory action. 
Such plaintiffs' interest in integrated community living surely was undif- 
ferentiated from anyone else's similar interest; yet the Court, affirming 
the community interest, found standing.365 This is significant for two 
reasons. First, it acknowledges another judicially cognizable collective 
right-a thirteenth amendment right to reside in a community the com- 
position of which is not determined by race. Second, it casts grave doubt 
on the Court's repeated assertions366 that generalized grievances-those 
shared by the community at large--cannot meet the requirements of the 
case-or-controversy provision. If that were so, congressional recognition 
of such interests would do nothing to alter or satisfy the constitutional 
minima. Gladstone and Traficante are the Court's implicit recognition 
358. Id. at 35 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930)). 
359. The rule might be seen merely as an attempt to ensure that defendants' waivers of this 
constitutional right are knowing and intelligent within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938). But such paternalism would be anomalous given that other constitutional rights under 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments may be waived unilaterally. 
360. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." 
361. 42 U.S.C. $5 3601-3619, 3631 (1982). 
362. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); 
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). 
363. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
364. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text. 
365. The fact that a statute explicitly provided standing is unimportant. If undifferentiability of 
the plaintiffs injury from the injury suffered by the public generally meant that no case or  contro- 
versy existed, as the Court suggested in Schlesinger and Richardson, then the congressional attempt 
to grant standing through the statute would be ineffective. It is the nature of the interest asserted 
vis-a-vis the Constitution that is important, not the source from which the interest springs. 
366. See supra notes 137-41, 201-03 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  73 Cal. L. Rev. 107 1985 
108 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7352 
that the community can have a stake in the outcome sufficient to have its 
interest represented by one of its members without running afoul of arti- 
cle 111. 
There are, in addition, two procedural analogs to the substantive 
collective rights that the courts have recognized. Generalized interests 
have been vindicated in the courts by representatives from the private 
and public sectors. When such representation is by a private individual, 
the courts refer to him as a private attorney general. When the public 
sector is involved in the representation, the concept of parens patriae is 
employed. 
Private attorneys general have been explicitly recognized in a variety 
of contexts. For example, in Newman v. Piggie Park  enterprise^,^^^ the 
Court specifically approved of individuals acting as private attorneys 
general to enforce provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.368 The 
private attorney general theory was also used in Traficante v. Metropoli- 
tan Life Insurance CO. ,~~ '  with respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1968,370 
and it has been used to enforce the 1965 Voting Rights and the 
Social Security It appears, however, that plaintiffs have never 
been accorded standing as private attorneys general in constitutional 
cases.373 Nonetheless, the concept of collective interest clearly inheres in 
the concept of private attorneys general, and it would be difficult to argue 
that policies more important than those contained in the Constitution 
exist. 
Parens patriae involves state action on behalf of its citizens pursuant 
to its duty to safeguard the general welfare of the people. The Supreme 
Court has accepted the principle of parens patriae In Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad,375 the Court permitted the state to bring a parens 
367. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). 
368. 42 U.S.C. $8 2000a to a-6 (1982) (as amended). 
369. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text. 
370. 42 U.S.C. $8 3601-3619, 3631 (1982) (as amended). 
371. Id. $5 1971, 1973 to 1973b-4 (as amended); see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544 (1969). 
372. 42 U.S.C.A. 48 301-1397f (West 1983); see National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
373. In United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), the Court analogized 
the right of class certification to the concept of the private attorney general in cases where the clnss 
representative's individual claim became moot or was otherwise resolved. Id. at 403. This analogy 
was dictum, however, as the Court ruled that appellate courts may review denial of a class certificn- 
tion motion even though the proposed representative's claim has become moot. The representative 
has standing to appeal because he has a "personal stake" in obtaining class certification within the 
traditional meaning of that language. 
374. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,258 (1972) (citing New York v. New Jersey, 256 
U.S. 296 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); 
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900)). 
375. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). 
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patriae suit to obtain injunctive relief against railroads allegedly violating 
the antitrust laws. And, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. ,376 the Court reaf- 
firmed the parens patriae principle, though it refused to permit the state 
as parens patriae to seek damages on behalf of its citizens. 
But here too, the Court has explicitly denied states the use of parens 
patriae suits to challenge federal government actions on constitutional 
grounds. In Massachusetts v. Mellon,377 the Court stated: 
It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judi- 
cial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the opera- 
tion of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some circumstances, 
may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens . . . it is no part 
of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations 
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and 
not the State, which represents them as parenspatriae, when such repre- 
sentation becomes appropriate . . . . 378 
One must remember, though, that Massachusetts v. Mellon and the cases 
that followed it were decided by a Court that had not focused its atten- 
tion on the concept of collective rights under the Constitution and the 
implications of their existence. Moreover, Mellon itself seemed not to 
question the existence of collective interests so much as it disputed 
whether the state was the appropriate representative to enforce them in 
this particular case.379 What is significant is that the parens patriae doc- 
trine represents an additional judicial recognition of circumstances in 
which collectively held rights may be vindicated by a litigant who cannot 
show the type of individualized injury normally required by the Court to 
confer standing. 
The courts, therefore, have frequently given express or implied rec- 
ognition to collectively held rights under the Constitution. Indeed, the 
idea of collective rights is not only consistent with the United States' 
constitutional and philosophical heritage, it is virtually compelled by it. 
What the courts have never done, however, is to synthesize these con- 
cepts with the doctrine of standing so that the doctrine permits protec- 
tion of such rights rather than functioning as a barrier to their assertion 
and vitality. It is therefore necessary to develop a new theory of standing 
that permits representation of collective rights without simultaneously 
threatening to inundate the courts with suits that are frivolous, duplica- 
tive or both. The next Section addresses this problem. 
376. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
377. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
378. Id. at 485-86 (citation omitted); see also Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 
277 (191 1) (parens patriae concept will not support original Supreme Court jurisdiction when the 
state in fact seeks to represent citizens' interests but not its own). See generally Note, Standing of 
States to Represent the Interests of Their Citizens in Federal Court, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 224 (1971). 
379. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485. 
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C. Standing to Vindicate Collective Rights 
As the law of standing exists today, collective interests in constitu- 
tional provisions cannot be effectively protected. Collective rights are 
vindicated from time to time when they fortuitously appear in cases in 
which a litigant can demonstrate individual standing, but there is no sys- 
tematic way for these rights to receive their due. The difficulty with cur- 
rent standing theory lies in its restrictive view of the case-or-controversy 
requirement. It is the Court, not the Constitution, that has defined a case 
in terms of the plaintiffs stake in the outcome and further defined that 
stake in terms of personal injury-in-fact. But as the Court itself has rec- 
ognized, there exists a collective interest in government behavior con- 
strained by constitutional limits-an interest the Court disparagingly 
refers to as "generalized grievances."380 What the Court fails to realize is 
that, in any society founded on the Lockean model, the citizens have an 
enormous collective stake in the governmental trustee acting within its 
powers and  limitation^.^^' When government violates the Constitution, 
society's interest is implicated, and that interest should be addressable in 
the 
Who is to represent the societal interest? Possible cases may be di- 
vided into two groups based on the constitutional provisions and govern- 
mental actions involved. In the first group, government actions violating 
the Constitution necessarily produce an injury-in-fact traceable to a spe- 
cific individual. For example, government suppression of speech in viola- 
tion of the first amendment produces two types of injury. One is 
collective; society's rights both to hear what the speaker would have 
said383 and to have government act according to the Constitution suffer 
when government becomes censor. The second injury is to the would-be 
speaker; his constitutional right to speak is impaired. This case presents 
a situation where judicial vindication of an individual's rights and redress 
of his injury a fortiori protects the public right simultaneously.384 Simi- 
larly, when the government conducts a search without probable cause or 
380. See supra notes 137-41, 201-03 and accompanying text. 
381. See supra notes 286-91 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 322-27 and accompanying text. In American society, three methods are 
available to address government's constitutional violations: through the political process, through 
the courts, and through exercise of the Lockean right of revolution. For most purposes, the first is 
both impractical and inappropriate, see supra notes 312-21 and accompanying text, and the last is 
impractical and undesirable. Locke himself made clear that the right of revolution is to be exercised 
only in cases of the grossest government malfeasance. Seesupra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
The true alternatives, therefore, are acquiescence in constitutional violations or resort to the courts. 
383. See supra notes 332-45 and accompanying text. 
384. By contrast, if the individual chooses to acquiesce in the violation of his constitutional right 
to speak, current standing doctrine leaves no one to protect the collective interest since the right to 
receive information has not been accorded explicit first amendrncnt status by the Court. See, c.g., 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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a warrant in violation of the fourth amendment, the criminal defendant's 
subsequent motion to suppress the fruits of the search also serves to in- 
voke the judicial power to protect the collective privacy interest embod- 
ied in the fourth amendment.385 In a series of cases,386 however, the 
Court has ruled that though the government might have violated the 
fourth amendment and though the defendant might have been directly 
injured thereby, he is without standing to complain of the government's 
illegal conduct. In such circumstances, the collective right cannot be 
vindicated under current standing doctrine, despite the presence of an 
individual injured in fact as a direct result of the constitutional violation. 
The difficulty arises because the Court has silently substituted the legally- 
protected-interest test for the injury-in-fact test of   tan ding.^" It has cre- 
ated a subgroup of cases where collective rights could be vindicated by 
individuals injured in fact, but where such individuals are refused stand- 
ing either to represent the collective interest or to seek redress of the 
injury-in-fact they have suffered as individuals. 
In the second group of cases, a governmental constitutional viola- 
tion cannot produce individualized injury-in-fact as that term has been 
interpreted by the Court. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, Schlesinger v. Reserv- 
ists Committee to Stop the War,3s9 United States v. R i c h a r d ~ o n , ~ ~ ~  and Ex 
parte Levitt 391 are examples of cases in this group. In these cases, it was 
impossible for the plaintiffs to demonstrate any injury-in-fact attributable 
to them individually; yet, if their allegations could have been proved, the 
government would have been guilty of violating the Constitution. None- 
theless, in Valley Forge, Schlesinger, and Richardson, the Court recog- 
nized the possibility that no conceivable plaintiff would have standing.392 
The two groups of cases suggest different tests for standing. Where 
the government's unconstitutional act can give rise to individualized in- 
jury-in-fact, it seems appropriate to insist that the one who challenges the 
action be one of those injured. But at the same time, the test of injury 
should remain faithful to the injury-in-fact standard that the Court has 
developed and should not retreat to the legally-protected-interest test 
unanimously repudiated by the Court.393 Thus, in the fourth amend- 
385. See supra notes 349-54 and accompanying text. 
386. See supra notes 179-92 and accompanying text. 
387. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
388. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text. 
389. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text. 
390. 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
391. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam); see supra note 129. 
392. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
393. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Sen .  Orgs., 
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); supra notes 214-26 and accompanying text. 
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ment context, the use of illegally seized evidence would constitute injury- 
in-fact to the defendant. He would therefore qualify as a representative 
of society's interest in privacy reflected in the fourth amendment. Simi- 
larly, a member of the public or a reporter who is excluded from the 
courtroom is injured in fact and is the appropriate person to represent 
the public's first amendment interest in open judicial proceedings. The 
Supreme Court has recognized this sort of vicarious representation of the 
public interest claimed by plaintiffs. As the court said in Sierra Club v. 
Morton,394 once a plaintiff has standing, he may argue the public interest 
in support of his claim that the government has exceeded its lawful 
authority.395 
The second group of cases, where the unconstitutional government 
action cannot result in injury-in-fact to an individual, poses a more diffi- 
cult problem for standing purposes. The Court has declared that such 
cases present "generalized grievances." Plaintiffs fail to present an arti- 
cle I11 case or controversy in these cases because their stake in the out- 
come is indistinguishable from that of anyone else.39G The result is that 
the collective right involved is left unprotected and unenforceable. 
Therefore, I propose that individuals be accorded standing, much as pri- 
vate attorneys to present constitutional challenges to unlawful 
government action on behalf of the collective public interest. There can 
be no question that the citizenry has a stake in the outcome of a constitu- 
tional case where the issue is whether the government has violated its 
charter. The conflict between the collective interest in constitutionalism 
on one hand and government's unlawful behavior on the other should be 
found to meet the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 111. There 
is, accordingly, no constitutional impediment to the concept of citizen 
standing in the kind of case described here, provided that one does not 
view all possible interests atomistically, each having no possible connec- 
tion to the others. 
Citizen standing as proposed here would, however, present two po- 
tential problems. First, if unregulated, it might open the doors of the 
federal courthouses to a flood of constitutional litigation from persons 
who would lack standing under current doctrine. Second, it raises the 
possibility that the citizens who undertake to represent the public interest 
may not be fit to do so. Both difficulties can be overcome through the use 
-- -- 
394. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
395. Id. at 737 (footnote omitted) (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 
(1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)). 
396. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Churcli & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
397. See supra notes 367-73 and accompanying text. 
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of a single device in citizen standing cases: the class action.398 Courts 
have always determined the appropriateness of prospective class repre- 
sentatives in class actions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
both that the representative party assert a claim typical of the class399 
and that he "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."400 
- - -  - -  
398. The standing proposal advanced here requires no modification of the class action device 
itself. Once the existence of judicially cognizable collective interests is recognized, established class 
action principles permit appropriate invocation of the judicial power to protect such interests. 
399. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The claims of named plaintiffs are typical of the class' claims 
when they are based on the same legal and remedial theories and when there is no adversity between 
the named plaintiffs and unnamed class members. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 8 1764 (1972); see also Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 
468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Clearly, when a single governmental act or pattern of acts is challenged as 
unconstitutional, a citizen's claim will be typical; the constitutional theories asserted will be common 
to all. It is possible, of course, that the class representative may not raise all of the possible constitu- 
tional objections to the challenged government activity. The failure of the representative and his 
counsel to raise and vigorously to pursue all nonfrivolous constitutional arguments goes directly to 
the representative's fitness to represent the class. See infra note 400. If the court feels that the 
named class representative overlooks or rejects appropriate arguments, certification of the class 
should be refused or, if already granted, should be withdrawn pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). 
"The district court may decertify a class after trial if plaintifs trial performance showed him or her 
to be an inadequate class representative." Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. 673 F.2d 798, 81 1 
(5th Cir. 1982) (citing Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980)), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 902 (1981). It  has been argued that the district court has an 
affirmative duty to decertify a class where the representative is unsuitable. Sessum v. Houston Com- 
munity College, 94 F.R.D. 316, 322 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 
(1st Cir. 1980)). But see Carpenter v. Steven F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 617-18 (5th Cir. 
1983) (suggesting that after trial, a new class representative should be appointed in preference to 
decertifying the class). 
There is also no possibility of judicially cognizable adversity among the class members. It  is, of 
course, conceivable that some members of the citizen class might not wish the government to correct 
its allegedly unconstitutional behavior. For example, supporters of Valley Forge Christian College 
might applaud the land grant even if it violated thkfirst amendment. This would not make plaintiffs' 
claims anv less reoresentative of the claims of the class. "Whether all the members desire to exercise 
these rights is not relevant to the issues in the litigation. The possibility that some might not, at this 
time, wish to exercise their right. . . does not preclude a class action." Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. 
Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 965 (1972). Moreover, one would hesitate to assert that there is a judicially cognizable interest 
in having government continue to violate the Constitution. Accordingly, though as a practical mat- 
ter there may not be unanimity among members of the citizen class with respect to any particular 
action, its absence does not undermine the propriety of the device. 
Similarly, class members may have divergent views on whether the government's action is con- 
stitutional, wholly apart from their feelings on its desirability. Such a difference of opinion does not, 
in this sort of public action any more than in any class action, constitute adversity among members 
of the class. It is the function of the courts, not the class members, to decide the constitutional issue. 
Indeed, to allow differences of opinion among class members to defeat the representativeness of the 
named plaintiff would make it impossible for anyone to raise the constitutional challenge at all. 
Thus, to allow diversity of opinion to preclude a public class action of the type advocated in this 
Article would be to recognize a theory of constitutional relativism similar to that discussed supra in 
notes 314-15 and accompanying text. In this case, however, diversity of public opinion would be the 
cause of the judiciary's decision not to resolve the controversy rather than a r&ult of judicial 
abstention. 
400. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Courts generally focus on two factual questions in determining 
whether the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interest of absent class members: 
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The federal courts certainly have not been reluctant to refuse to certify 
classes where the representative or counsel has been found to be inade- 
quate.*' When the plaintiff asserts citizen standing, and therefore pur- 
ports to represent the public interest, this inquiry will be crucial. 
The threat of multiple actions dealing with identical constitutional 
issues can also be met by the class action device. The federal courts 
should establish a nationwide central indexing system to catalog ongoing 
class actions invoking the collective-right, citizen-standing principles dis- 
cussed here. Once a citizen class is certified,402 all other district courts 
should refuse to entertain similar suits since the plaintiffs before them 
would already be parties in another case presenting the same question. 
Duplicative actions can be stayed, enjoined, or dismissed.403 In this man- 
ner, only one citizen-standing challenge to a particular governmental ac- 
tion could be maintained. It is precisely this sort of economy of judicial 
and litigative effort that the class action was in part designed to 
achieve.404 Appropriate use of the class action device, therefore, suggests 
a solution to the two practical problems associated with the proposal for 
citizen standing in constitutional cases suggested here.405 
Therefore, both the conceptual structure and an appropriate proce- 
whether the named plaintiffs can present a strong case on behalf of the entire class, Mack v. General 
Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and whether the attorneys representing the class will 
vigorously pursue the action. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Counsel must be qualified, experienced and adequate to conduct the litigation. 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 
(1974). The litigants must not be involved in collusive litigation, nor may named plaintiffs have 
interests antagonistic to those of the rest of the class. The named plaintiffs' interests must be coex- 
tensive with those of the remainder of the class. Id.; Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 290 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Finally, the court must be satisfied that the named plaintiffs will protect the duc 
process rights of absent class members. Eisen, 391 F.2d at 562. 
401. See, e.g., Green v. Carlson, 653 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiarn), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 944 (1982); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 88 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. 111. 1980); Tomkin v. 
Kaysen, 69 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
402. "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, thc 
Eourt shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). 
403. The mere pendency of a class action does not preclude parallel individual actions by class 
members. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE n 23.92 (2d ed. 1984). 
Nevertheless, "a court having in personam jurisdiction over a class suit [under Rule 23(b)(l) or 
(b)(2)] should have the power to enjoin competing actions that are vexatious and oppressive." Id. 
(footnote omitted). For the government to have to litigate the same constitutional question repeat- 
edly is oppressive, hence sound policy dictates the availability of injunctive relief. 
Moreover, if a central index of citizen standing cases were established, all other courts would be 
able to stay duplicative suits pending judgment in the class action, thus avoiding judicial inefficiency. 
See, eg., Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 692 F.2d 102, 106 (10th Cir. 1982); Leisner v. New York 
Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
494. See Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968); Kainz v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952). 
405. The other requirements of Rule 23 are easily satisfied by any case of the type described 
here. When the citizenry is the plaintiff class, the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(l) is satis- 
fied. In addition, the constitutionality of a government action is a question common to the class, as 
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dural device exist to permit recognition of a new type of standing in cer- 
tain constitutional cases. The availability of citizen standing would have 
changed the results in some, but not all, of the standing cases from the 
1 9 7 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  Sierra Club v. Mortonm7 provides an interesting example of 
how the limited citizen-standing theory would work. If one regards dim- 
required by Rule 23(a)(2). The other two criteria of Rule 23(a) have already been discussed. See 
supra notes 399-401 and accompanying text. 
With regard to Rule 23@), citizen-standing actions would be maintainable under subsections 
(l)(A), (l)(B) or (2). With respect to Rule 23(b)(l)(A), separate individual actions against a single 
government action or policy alleged to be unconstitutional could certainly result in inconsistent 
judicial interpretations establishing wholly incompatible standards of conduct for the government. 
Moreover, judgments in individual cases would have stare decisis value for future litigation and thus, 
within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(l)@), would tend to conclude the interests of other individuals not 
party to the action. 
As for Rule 23@)(2), an unconstitutional government act or  policy that by its nature is incapa- 
ble of producing individuated injury-in-fact, see supra notes 388-92, 396-97 and accompanying text, 
clearly constitutes an act generally applicable to the citizen class. In such cases, injunctive or declar- 
atory relief is, as a practical matter, the only appropriate remedy. The courts have interpreted the 
rule to require that "the party opposing the class has acted either in a consistent manner toward 
members of the class. . . or has established a regulatory scheme common to all class members." 7A 
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 399, 8 1775, at  19-20 (footnote omitted). Thus, Rule 23@)(2) 
is the section best designed for management of the type of class action proposed here. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has restricted the use of the class action device to some 
extent. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court held that in a diversity 
case, each member of the class (named or  unnamed) must satisfy the jurisdictional amount require- 
ment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 0982). Thus, the plaintiffs' claims may not be aggregated to satisfy the 
amount-in-controversy requirement. Accordingly, Zahn makes it more difficult for persons with 
small individual claims to pursue them as a class in the federal courts. 
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Court ruled that each class member 
whose name and address was readily ascertainable had to be individually notified of the action's 
pendency pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2). The Court also held that the proponent of the class 
was required to bear the entire cost of the notification. Eisen thus erects some substantial barriers to 
individuals' ability to undertake class action litigation. 
Finally, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), sharply restricted the appealabil- 
ity of orders denying class certification, finding them inappropriate bases for interlocutory appeals. 
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that denial of certification might well be the death knell 
of such litigation because the individual plaintiff would find it uneconomical to pursue litigation in 
the absence of class certification. Id. at 469-71. Nonetheless, the Court declined to permit interlocu- 
tory appeals despite the potential "incremental benefit" in situations where litigation would be ended 
by denial of class action certification. Id. at 473. 
The factor which unites these cases and distinguishes them from the type of public action pro- 
posed here is that they are all actions brought pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Such actions are 
characterized by the separable individual interests of the class members; typically such actions seek 
money damages which may vary according to the individual's involvement in the controversy. I t  is 
for this reason that the Court has strictly interpreted the requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) 
that individual notice be given to each member of the @)(3) class if practicable. Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The public actions supported by this Article, however, would be 
certified under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l) or (b)(2) and by definition do not involve injuries differentia- 
ble according to class member. Hence, there is no individualized interest allocable to absent class 
members. Recent Supreme Court cases simply do not address such actions. 
406. See supra Part 11, Section A. 
407. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
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inution of one's enjoyment of the environment as an in j~ry- in- fac t ,~~~ 
then the result of Sierra Club would not change. Because individualized 
injury-in-fact would be possible, citizen standing would not be 
available.409 
On the other hand, both United States v. Richardson410 and 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 41' would be decided 
differently under a doctrine of citizen standing. In Richardson, the Court 
denied standing precisely because the plaintiff had failed to allege an in- 
terest distinguishable from that of the public generally,412 a finding 
echoed by the Schlesinger majority.413 The concept of citizen standing 
urged here would seize upon that generalized public interest as a reason 
to find standing, not a reason to deny it. Without recognition of such a 
collective right to lawful government behavior, and standing to insist 
upon it, some provisions of the Constitution are unenforceable, dead- 
letter law. Similarly, the result in Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, IncS4l4 would be 
different. A broader standing doctrine, recognizing a collective "right to 
a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has 
violated by acting differently,'y415 would make the alleged constitutional 
abuse in Valley Forge subject to judicial review, precisely in order to vin- 
dicate society's generalized, but nonetheless fundamental, interest in gov- 
ernment behavior consistent with its trust. 
Finally, there remains the question of the nexus requirement. To 
the extent that it reflects the idea that the governmental action must not 
only harm the plaintiff, but must also violate some duty owed to himY4l6 
then the recognition of the government's duty to act constitutionally as a 
duty owed to all citizens would satisfy the nexus requirement. That duty 
is breached whenever government violates the Constitution, and the 
nexus requirement is automatically satisfied under the collective-right 
citizen-standing proposal advanced here. To the extent that the nexus 
requirement is, in Professor Tribe's words, "an attempt to reduce the risk 
408. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); seesupra notes 238-42 and accompany- 
ing text. 
409. If, however, the Supreme Court were to reverse its view of environmental damage cx- 
pressed in SCRAP, declaring it insufficient to give rise to individual injury-in-fact, then invocation of 
the citizen-standing doctrine would be appropriate. In that case, the result of Sierra Club would be 
reversed by the new standing concept. 
410. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
411. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
412. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. 
413. See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text. 
414. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text. 
415. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483. 
416. See Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633, 636 (1971). See generally L. TRIDE, 
supra note 8, 5 3-22, at 98. 
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that federal judges will unintentionally divert the central thrust of consti- 
tutional and statutory policies by allowing 'officious intermeddlers' to in- 
voke federal claims under provisions designed to benefit persons who 
may be entirely satisfied with the action ~hallenged,"~~' then the require- 
ment is unnecessary under this new concept of standing. If the "inter- 
meddler" can show injury-in-fact, then he should be entitled to invoke 
the judicial power. If he cannot make such a showing, then he is without 
standing unless no one else could suffer injury-in-fact either. The fact 
that some citizens may be satisfied with or unperturbed by the govern- 
ment action should not be a bar to standing; no one has the right to enjoy 
the perceived benefits of illegal government action. 
In short, the nexus requirement diverts attention from the public's 
collective interest in having its government operate with the consent of 
the governed. On a day-to-day basis, that consent is manifest in the Con- 
stitution, statutes, and other regulations-the rules for conduct of gov- 
ernment. Perhaps that is why the Court so sharply restricted the nexus 
requirement in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc. ,418 declaring its inapplicability except in taxpayer suits.419 Professor 
Tribe has suggested that even in taxpayer suits the requirement be aban- 
doned because it is "misguided," "unnecessary," and "~nwar ran ted . "~~~  
This Article supports that suggestion, but for an additional reason. Tax- 
payer standing was suggested, though repudiated, in Frothingham v. 
Mellon 421 and later adopted in Flast v. Cohen 422 to deal with a class of 
cases in which there could be no injury-in-fact under traditional doctrine. 
Citizen standing as suggested here, with appropriate recognition of the 
collective rights under the Constitution, would render taxpayer standing 
superfluous. Moreover, because the nexus requirement invariably oper- 
ates, when applied, to foreclose standing in cases in which the collective 
interest of society clearly calls for the availability of judicial intervention, 
it is inconsistent with our Lockean foundation. The nexus requirement 
must be abandoned because it forecloses needed judicial review, not 
merely because, as Professor Tribe it functions poorly as an 
empirical matter. 
This Article has proposed a bifurcated standing doctrine in constitu- 
tional cases. In cases in which the challenged governmental action can 
417. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, 8 3-22, at  99. 
418. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
419. Id. at 78-79; see supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text. 
420. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at  Supp. 12 (1979). 
421. 262 U.S. 447, 486-88 (1923). 
422. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
423. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, §§ 3-26, 3-27. 
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cause individualized injury-in-fact, the collective interest in lawful gov- 
ernment behavior is sufficiently protected if enforcement is left to the 
individuals directly suffering the harm. But in cases where the assertedly 
unlawful action cannot give rise to individual injury, the collective inter- 
est can only be adequately protected if individuals are given standing to 
represent the public interest. The public, the collective body, has a stake 
in the outcome whenever the issue is whether government has violated its 
charter. Each person in our society is one of the settlors and beneficiaries 
of the trust which is civil government under the Lockean model. When 
the trustee violates the trust, each person is aggrieved. A standing doc- 
trine consistent with the political philosophy so important to our consti- 
tutional system cannot fail to permit judicial challenge when the trust is 
broken. 
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